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GRANTS
W. Nicholson Price II†

ABSTRACT
Innovation is a primary source of economic growth and is accordingly the target of
substantial academic and government attention. Grants are a key tool in the government’s
arsenal to promote innovation, but legal academic studies of that arsenal have given them
short shrift. Although patents, prizes, and regulator-enforced exclusivity are each the subject
of substantial literature, grants are typically addressed briefly, if at all. According to the
conventional story, grants may be the only feasible tool to drive basic research, as opposed to
applied research, but they are a blunt tool for that task.
Three critiques of grants underlie this narrative: grants are allocated by government
bureaucrats who lack much of the relevant information for optimal decision-making; grants
are purely ex ante funding mechanisms and therefore lack accountability; and grants
misallocate risk by saddling the government all the downside risk and giving the innovator all
the upside. These critiques are largely wrong. Focusing on grants awarded by the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), the largest public funder of biomedical research, this Article delves
deeply into how grants actually work. It shows that—at least at the NIH—grants are awarded
not by uninformed bureaucrats, but by panels of knowledgeable peer scientists with the benefit
of extensive disclosures from applicants. It finds that grants provide accountability through
repeated interactions over time. And it argues that the upside of grant-investments to the
government is much greater than the lack of direct profits would suggest.
Grants also have two marked comparative strengths as innovation levers: they can
support innovation where social value exceeds appropriable market value, and they can directly
support innovation enablers—the people, institutions, processes, and infrastructure that shape
and generate innovation. Where markets undervalue some socially important innovations, like
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cures for diseases of the poor, grants can help. Grants can also enable innovation by
supporting its inputs: young or exceptional scientists, new institutions, research networks, and
large datasets. Taken as a whole, grants do not form a monolithic, blunt innovation lever;
instead, they provide a varied and nuanced set of policy options. Innovation scholars and
policymakers should recognize and develop the usefulness of grants in promoting major social
goals.
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INTRODUCTION

Grants play a key role in innovation policy. The federal government spent
over $64 billion in 2016 in grants to support scientific research.1 That sum is
vastly more than the government spends on prizes (under $0.1 billion), nearly

1. Historical Trends in Federal R&D, AM. ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT SCI.
https://www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/historical-trends-federal-rd
[https://perma.cc/3P22-A45C] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
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an order of magnitude greater than what it spends on research and
development tax credits (about $10 billion), and comparable to what it spends
on patents through a shadow tax on consumers (between $30 and $700 billion,
though difficult to estimate).2 Grants are especially prominent in the life
sciences. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the world’s largest public
funder of biomedical research.3 Every year, it administers over $29 billion in
grant funding to over 300,000 researchers in over 2,500 institutions.4 Through
their scale and ubiquity, grants significantly shape the progress of science and
innovation. Grants help determine which areas of science are studied and how,
make or break the careers of academic and non-academic scientists alike, and
guide the creation of new institutes and discipline-spanning resources.
So how should the grant system operate? When should we deploy grants
instead of patents or prizes to drive innovation? Whom should we fund and
what policies should govern that funding? These questions are not rhetorical:
2017 saw a high-profile fight between the Trump Administration and Congress
about science funding levels5 and an intense discussion in the scientific
community about new NIH grant-funding policies.6
If these questions addressed changes to patent law, we could draw on an
extensive literature about how patents shape innovation, what changes would
have what impacts, and what we should think about when proposing new

2. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 303, 361, 371 (2013) (defining grants as including both funds directed to external
researchers and funds spent on direct government research and basing patent expenditures on
the patent-enabled supra-competitive pricing that constitutes a “shadow tax” on consumers
of the patented good).
3. See
Grants
&
Funding,
NIH,
https://www.nih.gov/grants-funding
[https://perma.cc/8BJY-AZ4D] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
4. See
Budget,
NIH,
https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/budget
[https://perma.cc/PKP5-4WVZ] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) [hereinafter NIH, Budget].
5. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach & Lena H. Sun, Trump Budget Seeks Huge Cuts to Science and
WASH.
POST
(May
23,
2017),
Medical
Research,
Disease
Prevention,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/05/22/trump-budgetseeks-huge-cuts-to-disease-prevention-and-medical-research-departments/
[https://perma.cc/UAY9-28Y5] (noting the early unfavorable reactions to Trump’s proposed
budget); Robert Pear, Congress Rejects Trump Proposals to Cut Health Research Funds, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/us/politics/national-institutes-ofhealth-budget-trump.html [https://perma.cc/KA32-BCY3] (noting that Congress rejected
Trump’s proposed budget and introduced a bipartisan bill to increase spending).
6. See, e.g., Develop Your Budget, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/how-to-applyapplication-guide/format-and-write/develop-your-budget.htm
[https://perma.cc/6B4PEFPK] (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) (providing instructions to create a budget and noting that
there are “spending caps on certain expenses” in addition to salary caps); Sara Reardon, NIH
Announces Grant Limits, 545 NATURE 142 (2017) (discussing the concerns of the scientific
community in response to the NIH’s new budget policy).
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policies.7 If these questions considered the structure or funding of prizes for
achieving innovation goals, we could reach for another extensive literature
tackling similar issues.8 And if we wished to debate the relative merits of
patents, prizes, pure market allocation, government procurement, tax subsidies
for research-and-development, and grants, a substantial volume of scholarship
addresses such comparative issues.9 But the grant system itself? That occupies
a much emptier shelf in the library of innovation law.10
In the uncommon instances where grants appear in this literature, they
appear in comparative work evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of
different policy mechanisms for promoting innovation. In this context, a
consistent argument holds that grants suffer from an information disadvantage
relative to patents, and, to a lesser extent, prizes and tax incentives, because
they do not effectively aggregate private information.11 A closely related point
is that grants are particularly useful at funding basic research—that is, early
7. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent
Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies,
97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009);
John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505 (2010); Craig A. Nard &
John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619 (2007);
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications
for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010); Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent
Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672 (2014).
8. See Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI.
L. REV. 999, 1003–05 (2014) (noting that “the past two decades have seen a virtual explosion
of scholarship on prize systems, particularly within the economic and legal literatures on
intellectual property, but also in political philosophy and public health” and providing
extensive citations).
9. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 305 (“In recent years, articles comparing the
relative merits of patents, prizes, and grants have consumed thousands of pages in law reviews
and economics journals.”) (citing Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property
Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1473, 1530–34 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (reviewing recent literature)).
10. See, e.g., Laura Pedraza-Fariña, The Social Origins of Innovation Failures, 70 SMU L. REV.
377, 443 (2017) (“Legal scholarship on intellectual property and innovation law more broadly
has paid comparatively little attention to how to design grants and prizes to foster innovation,
and how grant-making interacts with other innovation policies—and patents in particular.”).
11. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1,
11–14 (1969). This argument applies with equal force to other exclusivity-based incentive
mechanisms, such as trade secrecy or regulatory exclusivity, since all exclusivity mechanisms
rely on allowing the innovator to charge supra-competitive prices to capture a greater portion
of the social welfare benefits of an innovation.
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stage research without immediate commercial applications—because firms
tend to undervalue basic research, which has substantial positive knowledge
externalities.12
Within the innovation law literature’s relatively sparse descriptions of
grants, three critiques recur—sometimes as explicit critiques, sometimes as
assumptions, sometimes as characterizations—about flaws in the grant system.
To be clear, not all scholars writing about grants raise all these critiques, or
make them uncritically. In this literature, grants are undertheorized, which is
both the point and the challenge. I reviewed closely the existing, brief
discussions of grants in the law-and-innovation literature, and common
threads emerged.
Part II describes these critiques. First, grants are allocated by government
bureaucrats who lack the market-value knowledge possessed by private firms
and therefore make suboptimal decisions about allocating funding to
projects.13 Second, because grants provide non-contingent ex ante funding,
they lack accountability and thus cannot ensure efficient and hard work by
innovators.14 And third, grants allocate risk suboptimally: the grantor takes
essentially all of the downside risk of the project (if the innovation fails, the
government is still out the money with nothing to show for it) and receives
little of the upside benefit (if the project succeeds, the innovator licenses or
commercializes the innovation, while the government misses out on the profits
and may even end up paying high prices for the innovation).15 Taken together,
these critiques lead to the conclusion that while grants may be an adequate, if
rather blunt, tool to drive basic research for which other innovation levers are
unhelpful, those other levers are often preferable when available. Jonathan
Adler, for instance, actively critiques the grant system on these grounds,
concluding that “the federal government should shift a substantial portion of
climate-related research and development funding from grants to prizes.”16 I
suspect that these critiques are also responsible for the relative dearth of
scholarship examining grants in depth. If grants are generally viewed as good
for basic research but flawed relative to other incentive levers, why spend
much time thinking about them?17

12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Section II.A.
14. See infra Section II.B.
15. See infra Section II.C.
16. Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate
Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); see infra Part II.
17. There are other potential explanations. Laura Pedraza-Fariña and Stephanie Bair, for
example, argue that legal scholars of innovation have focused on solving the free-rider
problem to the exclusion of other innovation challenges. See Stephanie Bair & Laura Pedraza
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The reality of the current grant system belies these three critiques. Part III
describes the grant system as it functions today, with substantial emphasis on
grants awarded by the NIH—perhaps the world’s most prominent grant
funder—to researchers at other institutions, and rebuts each critique.18 First,
the mechanics of grant application, review, and funding refute the narrative
that grants are allocated by information-poor bureaucrats. The grant system
uses a rigorous process of peer review to determine which proposals will be
funded. Part of this process involves detailed applications, which requires
potential grant recipients to share their own private information about the
likely costs and potential value of the proposed research. The evaluation itself
leverages the expertise of scientists with relevant experience and knowledge.
And the entire process is coordinated by agency representatives who combine
their own scientific background with knowledge about the innovation
priorities of the NIH and the government more generally.
Second, grantees are in fact accountable for grant-funded research. Each
grant operates within a context of ongoing funding streams, reporting
obligations, and repeat players. Even though any individual grant may lack its
own strong accountability mechanisms, the practical need to get the next grant
creates accountability for grant recipients.19
Third, the government gets more out of grants than the risk-allocation
critique implies. It’s true that the government does not usually profit directly
from grant-funded innovations, whether they succeed or fail. But the
government realizes a wide range of social benefits from innovation efforts,
including the creation of negative knowledge, the generation of innovation
structures, and the development of human capital.
Mistaken assumptions or inaccurate critiques change the relative
desirability of grants as a substitute for other innovation levers when those
levers fail. Consider patentable subject matter. Between 2012 and 2014, the
Supreme Court held unpatentable a broad swath of inventions that could be

Fariña, Anti-Innovation Norms, 112 NW. L. REV. 1069, 1076–78 (2018); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff,
Government Choices in Innovation Funding (with Reference to Climate Change), 62 EMORY L.J. 1087,
1100 (2013) (similarly lamenting the narrow focus of legal-academic literature). Because grants
do not address free-rider critiques directly, they may be of less interest to legal scholars with
that focus.
18. I argue that basic lessons from the NIH are generalizable, see infra note 203 and
accompanying text, but even to the extent they are not, understanding the workings of the
world’s largest public funder of biomedical research provides useful insight. See NIH, supra
note 3.
19. The ongoing grant cycle has other benefits. For instance, the ongoing need to seek
future grants impels grant recipients to generate publications that disclose results of funded
work.
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characterized as “laws of nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas.”20
These decisions prompted scholarly outcry: among other issues, what
incentives would remain for inventions that subject to this characterization,
like medical diagnostic methods or human genetic tests?21 In fact, the Court
raised exactly this question at oral argument.22 As it turns out, many medical
diagnostics and human genetic tests have been developed in large part by
grant-funded researchers. Rather than worrying about decreased patent
incentives, perhaps Congress should increase grant funding for these
inventions instead.23 If we think grants are fundamentally flawed innovation
levers, they are less likely to seem like good substitutes when other levers fail.
If, on the contrary, we are to use grants appropriately as a part of the
innovation toolbox, we should know how they really work: when they are
preferable substitutes, when they work poorly, and when they work best in
concert with other innovation incentives.24
Part IV describes the rich tools the grant system supplies to policymakers,
focusing on grants’ two key comparative advantages. First, grants can support
innovations whose social value exceeds their appropriable market value. This
describes basic research; because later applications of basic research are
variable and unpredictable, it has substantial spillovers (positive knowledge
externalities), and is undersupplied by private firms relative to its social
benefit.25 Private firms also generate inadequate information about which basic
research is worth funding. But a panel of experienced peer reviewers,

20. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 66 (2012) (citing
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
21. See Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of Personalized Medicine,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1907–13 (2016) (discussing the difficulties of obtaining patents
in diagnostic methods); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 256, 264–78 (2015) (discussing how diagnostic methods have been categorized as
“natural laws” rather than “applications”).
22. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives,
5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115, 1116–17 (2015) (citing Justice Sotomayor’s questions during oral
argument of Myriad and Mayo).
23. See id. at 1137–41 (discussing other incentives that can take the place of absent patent
incentives).
24. No innovation lever stands on its own; an innovation may be grant-funded in early
phases, patented shortly thereafter, developed using secret processes and relying on taxincentives, and even win a prize at the end. See, e.g., Pierre Azoulay et al., Public R&D Investments
and Private-sector Patenting: Evidence from NIH Funding Rules, 86 REV. ECON. STUD. 117, 140 (2019)
(finding that a $10 million boost in NIH funding leads to around 2.5 additional patents).
25. See generally Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL.
ECON. 297, 302–04 (1959).
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combined with disclosures from grant-seeking researchers, may be able to
make precisely that determination. At a broader level, the market systematically
undervalues some forms of innovation because market demand does not
reflect social welfare value. A powerful example is innovation targeting
diseases of the poor; because the poor often cannot pay for drugs, market
signals do not reflect the social welfare benefits of developing those drugs. The
grant system’s reliance on non-price signals brings risks of inefficiency or
cronyism, but its incorporation of non-market information also allows
different, useful allocation of funds beyond what markets would pick.
Second, grants can directly support innovation enablers—the people,
institutions, processes, and infrastructural resources involved in innovation—
in a way largely unavailable to other forms of directed innovation incentives,
especially patents and prizes. Basic research serves this role when it provides
the grounding for later research, but it is only one example. Grants can develop
human capital by providing training or otherwise enabling the research of
young scientists who will have longer careers ahead of them. Grants can also
target the processes or institutions of innovation by providing resources
specifically for interdisciplinary research (to build collaborations and
boundary-crossing networks) or for institutions (to provide physical or other
resources for collections of individuals). Finally, they can support
infrastructure, including datasets that enable future innovation, such as the
Precision Medicine Initiative’s All of Us dataset or the Human Genome
Project (both NIH-funded).
When policymakers can leverage the grant system’s strengths, grants can
be an effective innovation lever. But the inverse is also true. In situations where
private, market-based information accurately reflects the social value of an
innovation, grants are probably not the best lever to drive that innovation
because that private information can lead to an efficient allocation of
innovative activity among firms and innovation targets.
This Article argues that the dominant picture of scientific grants in the
innovation literature—the picture of a relatively straightforward and flawed
tool mostly good for basic research—is far too simple. Grants form their own
complex, massive set of innovation tools, with their own comparative
strengths, and are a far larger, better, and more varied part of the innovation
system than the innovation law literature has recognized.
II.

GRANTS IN THE INNOVATION LAW LITERATURE

Grants are undertheorized in the legal innovation literature. Where they
appear, it is principally as part of a comparison with other sorts of innovation
incentives, though even those comparisons tend to focus on patents and
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prizes, rather than grants.26 Daniel Hemel and Lisa Ouellette, for instance,
compare the innovation incentives of patents, prizes, grants, and tax R&D
incentives.27 They group incentives along three axes—who decides what
innovation will be funded, who pays for the innovation, and when is the
innovation funded—and conclude that each incentive is useful at different
times.28 Grants, they suggest, are most effective when the government is
especially good at identifying costs and benefits and when social benefits
exceed market signals of value—one of the two key strengths I describe here.29
They also note an important timing feature of grants: ex ante funding can
enable otherwise capital-constrained entities to innovate.30 Joshua Sarnoff,
Brett Frischmann, and Jonathan Adler have also considered grants in
comparisons of innovation levers.31 Characterizations of grants as an
innovation incentive, whether comparative or otherwise, have tended to
emphasize the information disadvantage faced by the grant system, but also
the positive role of grants in funding basic research.
The basic information-asymmetry story proceeds as follows. Innovators
determine whether to invest in a particular innovation based on their private

26. Compare Roin, supra note 8, at 1001–06 (providing approximately 4 pages worth of
citations on prizes versus the patent system), with Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 320–21
(citing, in a prominent and thorough taxonomy of innovation incentives, only one unpublished
manuscript and one law review article partially focused on grants). Camilla Hrdy has briefly
addressed grants in the context of analyzing federal versus state and local incentives for
innovation. See Camilla Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301,
1357–63 (2016) [hereinafter Hrdy, Patent Nationally] (discussing federal financing for
innovation, including grants, and arguing that such funding is limited to research with national
benefits); see also Camilla Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 52–53 (2015)
[hereinafter Hrdy, Commercialization Awards] (discussing Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) awards granted by federal research agencies like NIH).
27. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 310–15.
28. See id. at 326–52.
29. See id. at 375–76. These two features are both involved in the grant system’s ability
to use different information than markets, described in Part IV.
30. Id. at 334–38.
31. See Sarnoff, supra note 17, at 1089–90 (considering a broad range of potential
incentives in the climate-change context and noting the lack of empirical information on grant
functioning); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Likely Mismatch Between Federal Research & Development
Funding and Desired Innovation, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 363, 372 (2016) (lamenting the
focus of innovation law scholarship on intellectual property and market solutions to
innovation) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Likely Mismatch]; Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions:
Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 352–53, 356,
389–90 (1999) (noting that grants are useful for the production of public goods but tax
incentives are preferable in other situations); Adler, supra note 16, at 3–4 (comparing grants
and prizes in the context of climate change technology and concluding that prizes are generally
superior).
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estimations of the cost of innovating and the innovation’s market value.32 Nongrant mechanisms alter this private-information-based calculus: patents allow
firms to capture a larger fraction of the expected value of the innovation,33
prizes typically set a known reward against the privately-estimated cost of
innovating,34 and tax incentives directly defray the cost of innovating.35 Grants,
on the other hand, provide ex ante funds to pay innovation costs directly and
do not leverage private estimations of market value.
In 1983, Brian Wright showed formally that for patents to be superior to
other innovation incentives, private firms must have more information than
government funders.36 Scholars tend to agree that private firms have such an
information advantage.37 Suzanne Scotchmer and Nancy Gallini, for instance,
built on Wright’s analysis and noted that grants are poor aggregators of private
information.38
However, scholars have also long agreed that grants are important for
funding basic research, though this agreement is grounded in the economics
literature rather than the legal literature.39 Basic research is aimed at increasing
our scientific understanding of the world rather than focusing on useful
products. In 1959, Richard Nelson noted that basic research has potential
innovation benefits across a wide range of outputs and is often highly risky.40
As a result, private industry tends to invest in basic research at socially
suboptimal levels.41 Kenneth Arrow reiterated this argument in 1962 and
suggested that government funding of innovation helps resolve the problem,
though such funding raises questions of how much to spend and how to

32. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 326–27.
33. See id. at 327–28.
34. See id. at 327.
35. See id. at 328.
36. See Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research
Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691 (1983). Among other things, Wright deliberately omits
the possibility that the modeled innovation would provide information useful for future
innovations and therefore of independent social value. See id. at 692 n.1.
37. See, e.g., Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 9, at 327 (“Patents’ ability to take advantage
of private information is well recognized in the innovation-policy literature.”).
38. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Innovation
System?, 2 INNOV. POL’Y & ECON. 51, 54, 55–57 (2002).
39. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1693, 1721 (2008) (noting that grants “are probably the most important component of the
innovation system, in supporting basic research”); id. at 1724 (claiming general agreement that
grants are the right incentive for basic research, and that the only debate is about applied
research).
40. See Nelson, supra note 25, at 304.
41. See id.
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allocate it.42 Despite these questions of allocation raised by Arrow, other
incentive mechanisms, including patents and trade secrecy, are poor drivers of
the production of basic knowledge, giving grants the comparative advantage.43
These assessments of grants, especially in comparison with other
innovation policy levers, frequently incorporate three substantive critiques
about how grants work. First is reliance on decision-making by government
bureaucrats who often lack market actors’ superior knowledge; second is the
loss of accountability and incentives because grants rely on purely ex ante
funding; and third is problematic risk-allocation because the funder bears the
entire downside risk of the project and captures little of the upside benefit.
Some find these critiques essentially dispositive; Jonathan Adler concludes that
while “[f]ederal funding of science is worthwhile, particularly for basic
scientific research[,] federal R&D money rarely produces commercially viable
technologies or dramatic technological innovation.”44 The following Sections
detail each critique.
A.

BUREAUCRATIC DECISION-MAKING

Some criticize the grant system because it puts funding decisions in the
hands of relatively uninformed government bureaucrats. As Adler puts it,
“With government research grants . . . a federal agency typically determines the
goal to be achieved, the means to achieve that goal, and who will receive
funding to pursue it.”45 Frischmann agrees: “[T]he selection process for grants
relies on the government’s ability to assess the desirability of a project when
compared with an array of others . . . .”46 Lobbying groups have sometimes
seized on this complaint; the director of the Traditional Values Coalition
described NIH funding as “nameless, faceless bureaucrats doling out money

42. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619,
623 (1962).
43. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of
Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1905–06 (2013) (noting the challenge of appropriating the benefits
of basic knowledge); Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 256 (noting the inability of patents to claim
basic biomedical knowledge used in diagnostics under current law); Peter Lee, Social Innovation,
92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 24–42 (2014) (describing limitations of patents in creating incentives
for social innovation); id. at 47–52 (describing how government grants might help create such
incentives).
44. Adler, supra note 16, at 30.
45. Id. at 14.
46. Frischmann, supra note 31, at 353; see Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 307 (“For
grants . . . the government tailors the reward on a project-by-project or discovery-by-discovery
basis.”).
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like a federal ATM . . . .”47
This critique can involve concerns of either inadequate information or
cronyism. First, the government lacks information, at least relative to firms.
Firms may have private knowledge about both the general costs and benefits
of a potential innovation (relevant to the choice of which innovation to fund)
and about their own costs in pursuing that innovation (relevant to the choice
of which firm should pursue the innovation); the patent system especially
leverages private knowledge by letting firms decide which innovation to
pursue.48 Conversely, the government’s lack of this private information likely
leads to suboptimal choices about what innovation to fund and who should
undertake it.49 Michael Abramowicz argues specifically in the context of
orphan drugs that government officials are ill-equipped to distinguish efficient
from inefficient innovation subsidies.50 Zachary Liscow and Quentin Karpilow
capture this general concern about information asymmetries when they note
IP scholars’ deep “skepticism toward the government ‘picking winners’ to
encourage innovation in some technologies over others.”51
Second, leaving funding decisions in the hands of bureaucrats may result
in cronyism, favoritism, and political pressure shaping the process of grantfunding and scientific progress. Adler argues that historically, patrons of

47. Rick Weiss, NIH Faces Criticism on Grants, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2003),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/10/30/nih-faces-criticism-ongrants/504677ed-4c30-498e-b458-c992ecf6c6f4/?utm_term=.df4269595c8d
[https://perma.cc/65YK-JZRT]. The Coalition’s concerns eventually led to Senate hearings.
Rick Weiss, Critics of NIH Studies Prompt Senate Hearings, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2004),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/01/19/critics-of-nih-studiesprompt-senate-hearing/fa9de180-39ab-4dca-8757-34e7dfb80b4e/?utm_term=.4a2e
01a478c7 [https://perma.cc/2UHY-J9KX].
48. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 38, at 54–55 (explaining that IP has substantial
benefits if firms have superior knowledge); see also Wright, supra note 36, at 703 (noting that
patents benefit from “ex ante researcher information relating to the value of the invention”).
49. See Adler, supra note 16, at 29 (“Allocating grant money effectively requires the grantmaking entity to pick ‘winners’ and ‘losers,’ something the government has rarely done well.”).
Frischmann notes:
[T]he selection process for grants relies on the government’s ability to
assess the desirability of a project when compared with an array of
others . . . . If the research is expected to further a commercial end then tax
incentives may be more effective than grants because final project selection
is left to the best informed investor, the firm.
Frischmann, supra note 31, at 353.
50. See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of Intellectual
Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366–67 (2011).
51. Zachary D. Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law, 95
WASH. U. L. REV. 387, 390 n.9 (2017); see also Lee, supra note 43, at 52 (“[G]overnments are
notoriously poor at ‘picking winners.’ ”).
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science preferred grants to prizes because grants entailed greater discretion, so
that patrons could “reward their friends and allies and ensure that only those
with the right ideas received funding.”52 Cronyism and corruption lead to many
ills, including inefficiency, decreased trust in government, and lower
innovation, as only ideas that match the idiosyncratic preferences of the funder
receive funding.
B.

UNACCOUNTABLE EX ANTE INCENTIVES

A second major critique relates to the ex ante nature of grant funding and
its consequent lack of accountability. Grants provide funds ex ante to
researchers without conditioning the funds on success.53 Thus, the argument
goes, grants provide less accountability and lower incentives to researchers to
work hard and to use resources efficiently.54 Sarnoff laments that “direct
subsidies may be provided to university professors who fail to produce quality
research” and thus “over-reward innovation efforts.”55 As Gallini and
Scotchmer memorably describe it, in one-off grant contexts, “researchers
might be inclined to ‘take the money and run.’ ”56 Hemel and Ouellette add
that this unconditionality may cause problems earlier in the process, leaving
grant-seeking researchers with lower incentives when choosing projects.57
The researcher, in this critique, has little skin in the game, in striking
contrast to patents, prizes, or even R&D tax incentives. Under those regimes,
the researcher must spend her own money to conduct the research or acquire
funding from private sources with, presumably, strings attached.58 And if she

52. Adler, supra note 16, at 23 (citing Robin Hanson, Patterns of Patronage: Why Grants
Won over Prizes in Science 17 (July 28, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard
Law School Library)); see also id. at 29 (“[T]raditional grant funding is more subject to political
pressure[.]”).
53. Indeed, if grants were conditioned on success, they would merely be prizes with
precedent loans. Grants may condition continued funding on other requirements, such as
continued reporting, documented expenditures, or something else; these complications will be
described below. See infra Section III.B.2.a.
54. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 42, at 624 (noting this problem and describing potential
mitigating factors); see also Sarnoff, supra note 17, at 1125.
55. Sarnoff, supra note 17, at 1125.
56. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 38, at 54 (making and then immediately critiquing
this critique).
57. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 9, at 334 (quoting Rachel Glennerster, Michael
Kremer & Heidi Williams, Creating Markets for Vaccines, 1 INNOVATIONS: TECH.,
GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 67, 71 (2006)). Of course, the ability of researchers to later
pursue patents on their innovations results in blending the incentive features of grants and
patents.
58. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 9, at 334–37. As Hemel and Ouellette note, the
case of tax incentives is slightly more complicated; they create approximately ex ante incentives
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does not succeed in the research, she gets nothing—patents typically provide
a route to profit only if a successful product is created, prizes go only to the
victor, and R&D tax incentives are usually meaningless without underlying
profits. Thus, she faces incentives to conduct her work efficiently, effectively,
and successfully to recoup her own expended funds. Grants, in this view,
provide few incentives in the same vein.
C.

PROBLEMATIC RISK ALLOCATION

The third, related critique involves the allocation of risk in grant-funded
research efforts. Brett Frischmann argues that “when utilizing grants, the
government, as investor-principal, often bears the entire downside risk of an
unsuccessful project.”59 Because of the unconditionality of grants, when a
grant-funded researcher fails to innovate, the funder has no way to recover the
expended funds. This critique implicitly relies on a private-contracting analogy,
where the government, as innovation funder, has the same sort of profit-andloss incentives as a private party. The reality, as discussed below, is more
complex.60
The other half of this critique is that the grantor also receives little of any
upside benefit of successful innovation. If the government funds
groundbreaking research that results in a blockbuster drug, the government
receives none of the profit—and in fact, is instead likely to pay much of that
drug’s future cost because it pays for a large fraction of health-care costs.61
Under an older, contrasting model, the federal government retained robust
rights in research it funded, though it rarely exploited them.62 This model
largely ended with the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.63 Under BayhDole, grant recipients keep patent rights to federally funded research, with the
rationale that these private actors can more effectively act to commercialize

that are available within the same year as the funding, but they require some source of stopgap funding such as venture capital or other resources; and if a company fails or has no income,
tax credits are worthless. See id. at 336–37. These concerns are mitigated by fully refundable
tax credits, offered by some states. See id. at 337–38.
59. Frischmann, supra note 31, at 387 (cited with approval by Sarnoff, supra note 17, at
1118).
60. See infra Section IV.A.1.
61. See, e.g., Roin, supra note 8, at 1039–44 (describing government payments for drugs
through health insurance systems).
62. See Danielle Conway-Jones, Research and Development Deliverables under Government
Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Agreements and CRADAs: University Roles, Government Responsibilities
and Contractor Rights, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 181, 186–88 (2004) (describing the history of
federal rights in funded research).
63. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended in
various sections of 35 U.S.C.).
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the nascent technology.64 A vast literature considers the benefits of this move.65
Notwithstanding whether this transfer of rights to private parties was
necessary or beneficial on net, the fact remains that because the government
does not retain rights to funded inventions, it lacks the ability to capture the
upside of those inventions and often must pay to access them.66
This complaint about government inability to capture the upside of grantfunded research appears most forcefully in the public health literature, where
scholars decry the lack of access to the products of government-funded
research.67 In the innovation literature, on the contrary, the cost of reduced
access is often classified as a necessary evil to drive the commercialization
effort.68
III.

GRANTS IN PRACTICE (AT THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH)

This Part describes how grants really work. It begins with a basic overview
of the grants ecosystem. It then turns to the NIH, and describes in

64. 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2018); see Conway-Jones, supra note 62, at 188–92 (giving a history
of technology transfer legislation and executive actions). The Bayh-Dole Act addressed only
universities and nonprofits. The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1701), in a parallel structure, enabled
government researchers to retain title to patents. And Executive Order 12618 extended the
Bayh-Dole Act to for-profit corporations.
65. For a few places to start, see, for example, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and
Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV.
1663 (1996); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual
Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691
(2001); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003); Emily Michiko Morris, The Many Faces of Bayh-Dole, 54
DUQ. L. REV. 81 (2016); DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL
INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE
BAYH-DOLE ACT (2004).
66. Under § 202(c)(4) of the Bayh-Dole Act, the federal funding agency shall receive a
worldwide, nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, fully paid-up license to practice the
invention on behalf of the United States (or have the invention practiced). However, the BayhDole Act covers only federally funded research and may not cover other patented inventions
necessary to practice the innovation.
67. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, ‘Government Patent Use’: A Legal
Approach to Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 791 (2016) (describing the problem and
proposing the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018) to help address the concern).
68. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standard of Patentability, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 503, 507–15 (2009) (describing the rationale for patents to allow firms to recover the
high costs of drug discovery); but see, e.g., Glennerster et al., supra note 57, at 68–70, 77
(describing the desirability of minimizing deadweight loss from drug patents).
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considerable detail the NIH grant-funding process, organized around the three
critiques presented in Part I.
A.

AN OVERVIEW OF GRANTS

External grants funded by the NIH are the focus of this Article, but some
initial context is useful. The NIH is not the only funder of grants in the federal
government, the federal government is not the only funder of grants, and
grants are not the only way the federal government invests directly in research.
How do grants work, at a basic level? Typically, the sponsoring agency
solicits applications for funding (at the NIH, frequently “requests for
applications,” or RFAs) at a particular level of generality, which can range from
almost totally open calls for worthy research to very specific calls for proposals
to address a particular issue.69 Prospective grantees submit applications, which
typically include information about their qualifications, the research they
propose to undertake (often including preliminary data), and how much they
expect it to cost—that is, how they expect to spend the grant funds. The
grantor decides through some mechanism—much more on this later—which
of the applications, if any, to fund, and then disburses the money either fully
prospectively, in tranches, or as reimbursements once research expenses are
incurred.70 Often, grants come with obligations, which can range from
acknowledging the funder to committing to make any resulting knowledge
publicly available.71
Grants are not the only way the government directly funds innovation.72
The government may also directly conduct intramural research by employing
scientists at, for instance, National Laboratories or laboratories at the NIH or
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.73 If the federal government
relies instead on non-governmental researchers, it uses grants when it wishes
to fund research but does not “acquire . . . property or services for the direct
benefit or use of the United States Government” and “substantial
involvement” of the federal agency is not expected.74 If the government will

69. See infra Section III.B.1.
70. See NIH, NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT IIA-59 (2016) [hereinafter NIH
GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT].
71. See infra Section III.B.2 (describing disclosure requirements).
72. Indirectly, the government funds innovation through several mechanisms already
mentioned, including R&D tax credits and the enforcement of patent and trade secrecy laws
(which fund research through ex post “shadow taxes” on users of the patented or secret
technology). See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 9, at 320–26.
73. See Sarnoff, supra note 17, at 1132–36 (describing the role of government agencies in
promoting research and development).
74. 31 U.S.C. § 6304 (2018).
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acquire goods or services, it uses the procurement system—a $440-billionannual-spending behemoth75—instead.76 If the federal agency expects to be
substantially involved, such as in collaborations between National
Laboratories and private industry, the agency uses Collaborative Research and
Development Agreements (CRADAs) to direct the collaboration.77 The
federal government may also offer prizes, though these remain rare and
limited.78 While each of these different forms of direct government subsidy is
substantial and important,79 this Article focuses on federal extramural grants:
the distribution of funding to innovators outside the government’s walls
without the expectation of government involvement or government receipt of
goods or services. Such grants are especially important to university
researchers.80
Although federal agencies are the dominant grant funders today, this was
not always the case and they are not the only source of grant funding.
Governments at any level, including federal, state, and local, may fund research
grants.81 Private not-for-profit organizations may also fund research grants.82
Grants may be funded internally by universities or other research institutes out
of their own funds.83 Finally, grants may be funded by private industry, a
funding source that has received increasing attention though it remains
comparatively small.84 International grant funding is similarly diverse, though

75. NAT’L CONTRACT MGMT ASS’N, ANNUAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTING 2 (2016).
76. See 31 U.S.C. § 6303 (2018); Conway-Jones, supra note 62, at 192-97 (detailing the
rights and responsibilities of government and contractors in procurement agreements).
77. 31 U.S.C. § 6305 (2018).
78. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 9, at 317–18.
79. See, e.g., Sarnoff, Likely Mismatch, supra note 31, at 375–80 (comparing several direct
sources of government funding, focusing on direct funding over market regulation like patent
law).
80. Barry Bozeman & Monica Gaughan, Impact of Grants and Contracts on Academic
Researchers’ Interactions with Industry, 36 RESEARCH POL’Y 694, 694 (2007).
81. See, e.g., All CIRM Grants, CAL. INST. REGENERATIVE MED.,
https://www.cirm.ca.gov/grants [https://perma.cc/BC2F-R6ZG] (last visited March 10,
2019) (listing grants awarded by California’s state-funded stem-cell research agency). For a
description of how state and local governments provide innovation financing more generally,
see Hrdy, Patent Nationally, supra note 26, at 1363–75.
82. See LILY E. KAY, THE MOLECULAR VISION OF LIFE (1993), passim (describing the
support provided by the Rockefeller Foundation for the California Institute of Technology
and its development of the field of molecular biology).
83. See, e.g., MCubed, UNIV. MICH., http://mcubed.umich.edu/ [https://perma.cc/
PR8R-ZDUU] (last visited March 10, 2019) (describing the university-funded MCubed grant
program for intramural research).
84. Bozeman & Gaughan, supra note 80, at 694 (“[A]t no time during the history of the
modern U.S. research university . . . has industry provided as much support for university
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the relative balance between different governmental levels, not-for-profit, and
for-profit funding may vary between countries.85
In the United States, federal research grants have grown tremendously in
the last half-century.86 In the first half of the twentieth century, private
foundations provided most extramural funding; the Rockefeller Foundation,
for instance, was mostly responsible for the early growth of molecular biology
as a field.87 After World War II, the federal science budget grew tremendously,
and the government displaced private foundations to become the dominant
funder of research.88 Today, while the private sector spends more on research
than the federal government does, it spends mostly within its own walls; the
federal government remains the dominant source of extramural scientific grant
funding, especially for basic research.89
Within the federal government, many agencies fund research through
grants, including the Department of Defense, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Department of Energy.90 Two agencies especially focus on
funding basic research: the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the NIH.
The NSF funds research across many scientific fields, including substantial
amounts of basic biological research.91 But the largest funder of grant-based

research as any of the top five government funding agencies.”). Private R&D funding as a
whole is large, but mostly intramural. See id. (noting that industry is the leading source of R&D
funding nationally). Nonetheless, industry grants have been perceived as having outsized
importance relative to their size. See id. at 695; see also Mats Benner & Ulf Sandstrom,
Institutionalizing the Triple Helix: Research Funding and Norms in the Academic System, 29 RES. POL’Y
291, 293 (2000) (noting how industry funding can change research trajectories).
85. An overview of the international grant system is beyond the scope of this Article.
For a few useful resources, see, e.g., Christoph Grimpe, Extramural Research Grants and Scientists’
Funding Strategies: Beggars Cannot be Choosers?, 41 RES. POL’Y 1448, 1450 (2012) (giving an
overview of the European and German grant systems); SUSAN WRIGHT, MOLECULAR
POLITICS 32–36, 60–63 (1994) (giving a history of the United Kingdom’s grant-funding system
in the twentieth century).
86. WRIGHT, supra note 85, at 21.
87. Id.; see also KAY, supra note 82, passim.
88. WRIGHT, supra note 85, at 21.
89. See Mike Henry, US R&D Spending at All-Time High, Federal Share Reaches Record Low,
AM. INST. PHYSICS (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.aip.org/fyi/2016/us-rd-spending-all-timehigh-federal-share-reaches-record-low [https://perma.cc/VJG5-GRLA] (noting that private
spending reached 69% of total R&D while federal spending dropped to 23%, but also noting
that the federal government remains the top funder of basic research).
90. See Grant-Making Agencies, GRANTS.GOV, https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/
learn-grants/grant-making-agencies.html [https://perma.cc/S8MZ-DN3N] (last visited
March 10, 2019).
91. Richard Freeman & John Van Reenen, What If Congress Doubled R&D Spending on the
Physical Sciences?, 9 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 1, 6 (2009); Thomas O. McGarity, Peer Review
in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 15–16.
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research by far, focusing entirely on biomedical science, is the NIH, “the center
of a vast research system unmatched in size and scope throughout the
world.”92 The NIH comprises twenty-seven different Institutes and Centers
(collectively, “Institutes”), each focused on a “specific disease area, organ
system, or stage of life”; examples include the National Cancer Institute, the
National Human Genome Research Institute, and the National Institute on
Aging.93 Of these, twenty-four make grant awards.94 The NIH expends about
$37.3 billion in biomedical research per year; 10% of that is spent on its own
intramural research programs, and around 80% on extramural grants.95 “[I]n
the market for biomedical research, NIH is the 800 pound gorilla.”96
B.

TESTING THE THREE CRITIQUES AT THE NIH

Part II introduced three critiques of the grant system: they rely on
bureaucratic decision-making; they are largely unaccountable due to ex ante
funding; and they poorly allocate risk by giving the grantor most of the
downside risk and little of the upside. These critiques largely fail to reflect the
reality of the modern grant system, at least as practiced at the NIH.
Uninformed bureaucrats do not make the principal funding decisions, which
are instead effectively made by panels of well-informed peer scientists.
Funding is only ex ante and (mostly) unaccountable for single grants, but
researchers are repeat players and depend on the next grant as well, creating
accountability.97 And rather than misallocating downside risk entirely to the
NIH and the upside entirely to the researcher, the NIH actually sees much
more upside benefit—and researchers more downside cost.
1. Bureaucratic Decision-Making
How are grant decisions made at the NIH?98 In brief: the NIH seeks grant
applications, peer reviewers evaluate and compare the grant applications

92. WRIGHT, supra note 85, at 26.
93. For a full list of the twenty-seven institutes and centers, see List of NIH Institutes,
Centers, and Offices, NIH, https://www.nih.gov/institutes-nih/list-nih-institutes-centers-offices
[https://perma.cc/5TMP-2LTN] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) [hereinafter List of NIH Institutes].
94. Understanding the NIH: Finding the Right Fit for Your Research, NIH,
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/understanding-nih.htm
[https://perma.cc/W5W6-ZGES]
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
95. NIH, Budget, supra note 4.
96. Freeman & Van Reenan, supra note 91, at 19.
97. As mentioned above, grants do not act in isolation; researchers may also be able to
patent useful inventions, which provides an additional incentive. However, this Article focuses
on incentives internal to the grant system.
98. See generally Grants Process Overview, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/
grants_process.htm [https://perma.cc/2VXH-ZYQW] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
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submitted in response, and the NIH makes final funding decisions. In both
the seeking of grant applications (that is, deciding what areas of innovation to
fund) and the process of peer review (that is, deciding which innovators and
projects specifically to fund), the NIH funding process belies the critique that
grant-funding decisions are made by bureaucrats lacking relevant knowledge.
This is especially true for the broad, open R01 research project grant
program.99 As Richard Freeman and John Van Reenen put it:
At the heart of the American biomedical science enterprise are the
R01 grants that the NIH gives to fund individual scientists and their
teams of postdoctorate employees and graduate students. The
system of funding individual researchers on the basis of unsolicited
applications for research support comes close enough to
economists’ views of how a decentralized market mechanism
operates to suggest that this ought to be an efficient way to conduct
research compared, say, to some central planner mandating research
topics. The individual researchers choose the most promising line of
research on the basis of “local knowledge” of their special field. They
submit proposals to funding agencies, where panels of experts—
“study sections” in the NIH world—give independent peer review,
ranking proposals in accordance with criteria set out by funding
agencies and their perceived quality. Finally, the agency funds as
many proposals with high rankings that it can within its budget
constraints.100

This Section explores the grant-funding process.
a) Seeking Grant Applications
The first step of innovation funding is deciding what areas of innovation
to fund. Some innovation incentives, like prizes, typically require that the target
be fully identified beforehand. Others, like patents, require no ex ante
identification by any administrator; private firms decide what opportunities to
pursue. Grants might resemble prizes, in that the government identifies
beforehand what it would like to fund. As we shall see, this is only partially
true; at the NIH, some grant funding (“solicited” applications) looks like
broadly-defined prizes, with innovation targets identified up front; other
funding (“unsolicited” projects) resembles patents, in that the agency is open
to a very wide range of possible projects. In either form, the NIH announces
that it will accept applications in a “Funding Opportunity Announcement”

99. The NIH’s “R” grants provide support for research projects. See Research Grants (R),
NIH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/funding/grant-writing-and-application-process/researchgrants-r.shtml [https://perma.cc/3T57-AH6H] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
100. Freeman & Van Reenen, supra note 91, at 18–19.
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that lays out the parameters for what sorts of grants might be funded.101
Unsolicited grants allow individual innovators to suggest their own
projects within very broad parameters. The NIH has created a standing set of
“parent announcements” that last for a number of years, with standard
application dates.102 Under the announcements, researchers can propose their
own project, so long as it fits within the very broad mission of the NIH and
of the funding Institute (for instance, cancer-related research to be funded by
the National Cancer Institute).103 The broadest and most well-known of these
parent announcements is the R01 Research Project Grant, which “supports a
discrete, specified, circumscribed project in areas representing the specific
interests and competencies of the investigator(s).”104 Other standing parent
announcements exist for smaller research projects, grants for training young
scientists, fellowships, and professional development grants.105 Overall, this set
of funding represents a “deliberate policy of relying on the judgment of the
scientific community as a whole, through investigator-initiated proposals, to
determine the scientific agenda and identify the areas in which progress is most
likely.”106 Historically, around 80 to 90% of NIH grant awards are

101. See infra notes 116–119 and accompanying text.
102. What Does NIH Look For?, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/what-does-nih-lookfor.htm [https://perma.cc/C2TU-4FKR] (last updated May 24, 2016); Parent Announcements
(For Unsolicited or Investigator-Initiated Applications), NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/
parent_announcements.htm [https://perma.cc/7JSK-UWLD] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Parent Announcements].
103. Proposals must fit the mission of an NIH Institute, so unsolicited grants are not a
pure free-for-all. Nevertheless, the collective set of NIH Institutes covers a very wide swath
of biomedical research: Institutes focus on general medical sciences, environmental health,
diseases (cancer, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, allergies, infectious diseases, arthritis,
musculoskeletal disease, skin disease, deafness, diabetes, digestive disease, kidney disease,
mental health, neurological disorders, and stroke), minority populations, techniques (genomic
research, biomedical imagining, bioengineering, nursing, clinical research, information
technology, and translational science), life stages (aging, child health, and human development)
and organ systems (eyes, hearts, lungs, blood, and teeth). List of NIH Institutes, supra note 93.
104. NIH Research Grant Program (Parent R01), Announcement No. PA-06-160, NIH,
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PA-16-160.html
[https://perma.cc/3V9MW2AP] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (announcing availability of R01 grants from 20 National
Institutes as well as the National Library of Medicine; the National Center for Complementary
and Integrative Health; and the Office of Research Infrastructure Programs’ Division of
Program Coordination, Planning and Strategic Initiatives for the three years beginning in May
2016).
105. See Parent Announcements, supra note 102 (listing parent announcements in the R
(research), T (research training), K (career development), and F (fellowships) series, among
others).
106. INSTITUTE OF MED., NIH EXTRAMURAL CENTER PROGRAMS: CRITERIA FOR
INITIATION AND EVALUATION 49 (Frederick J. Manning, Michael McGeary & Ronald
Estabrook eds., 2004).
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unsolicited.107
The NIH also solicits research proposals, which look a bit more like
prizes—albeit very broad prizes—inasmuch as they involve greater ex ante
decision-making about what areas of innovation are worth funding. Solicited
proposals are intended to address areas the agency thinks worth funding for a
variety of reasons, including “to support research in an understudied area of
science, to take advantage of current scientific opportunities, to address a high
scientific program priority, or to meet additional needs in research training and
infrastructure.”108 Soliciting research often deeply engages active researchers;
Institutes frequently convene groups of scientists who discuss what research
is ongoing, what opportunities exist, and what the Institute should fund.109
One scientist described such a group conducted at the National Cancer
Institute as a “really intense think tank” that realized a need “to bring different
disciplines together and enable them to really think differently about
cancer.”110 Once the group of scientists mapped roughly what the program
should look like to accomplish this scientific/innovation goal, NCI staff “went
back internal,” and decided how precisely to shape the program.111 The exact
contours of this process vary substantially across Institutes.112 Even where
priorities are generated by NIH employees, many of them are trained as
scientists in their own right.113
Solicited research programs also grow from top-down priorities. Congress

107. NIH, Research Project Grants: New (Type 1) Awards and Percentage to Targeted Research
(1997–2017),
https://report.nih.gov/NIHDatabook/Charts/Default.aspx?showm=Y&
chartId=25&catId=2 [https://perma.cc/VAF3-UVBK].
108. What Does NIH Look For?, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/what-does-nih-lookfor.htm [https://perma.cc/3Y4G-V9H9] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
109. See INSTITUTE OF MED. & COMM. ON THE NIH RESEARCH PRIORITY-SETTING
PROCESS, SCIENTIFIC OPPORTUNITIES AND PUBLIC NEEDS: IMPROVING PRIORITY SETTING
AND PUBLIC INPUT AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 49–51 (1998) (describing
various bottom-up procedures for setting research priorities at Institutes) [hereinafter IOM,
PRIORITY SETTING].
110. Interview with Anonymous Senior Scientist (June 7, 2017) (on file with author).
111. Id.
112. See IOM, PRIORITY SETTING, supra note 109, at 51 (noting “tremendous variability”
in Institutes’ “systems for receiving advice, planning, and setting priorities . . . . [S]ome
institutes appear to adopt plans developed by a proactive staff with the endorsement of
advisory groups, whereas others follow closely the recommendations of external advisory
groups”).
113. See Marion Zatz, A View from the NIH Bridge: Perspectives of a Program Officer, 22
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY CELL 2661, 2662–63 (2011) (“Like many of my colleagues at the NIH,
I came to this position following a career as an independent research scientist, where I
developed many skills that are essential for being a successful researcher or teacher, and for
being a [program officer].”).
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can directly set research priorities, either generally, by deciding how much
money to appropriate to a particular Institute (and, accordingly, its broad
research focus), or specifically, as the 21st Century Cures Act did in supporting
the Precision Medicine Initiative.114 The President or other White House
officials can also drive priorities; President Obama directly proposed the
Precision Medicine Initiative, aimed at generating and collecting the health data
of a million Americans for future research purposes, and 2016’s Cancer
Moonshot, focused on fighting cancer.115 The Human Genome Project was
similarly the subject of high-level executive focus. The Directors of Institutes
or of the NIH can also shape the agency’s funding priorities.116 Even if
priorities are established politically, however, groups of active researchers are
still involved in determining how the top-down priority should be
implemented.
Once the funder has decided what opportunities to pursue, it issues a
Funding Opportunity Announcement, typically as either a “Program
Announcement”117 or “Request for Application” (RFA).118 A Program
Announcement indicates an area of interest, and an RFA formally solicits grant
applications “in a well-defined scientific area to accomplish specific program
objectives.”119 It describes how much funding the NIH expects to make

114. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 1001(b)(4)(A), 130 Stat. 1033 (2016)
(appropriating $1.455 billion for the Precision Medicine Initiative); id. at § 2011 (amending the
Public Health Services Act to “encourag[e]” the Secretary of Health and Human Services “to
establish and carry out . . . the ‘Precision Medicine Initiative’ ”).
115. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Cancer’s IP, 96 N.C. L. REV. 297 (2018) (describing the Cancer
Moonshot and describing the intellectual property challenges arising in the context of cancer).
116. The NIH Director is involved in budget negotiations with Congress; Institute
Directors have final say on areas of funding emphasis and can identify special areas of
emphasis. See NIH, SETTING RESEARCH PRIORITIES AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH 15 (1997). In addition, the Director has substantial influence over a designated
funding source, the Common Fund, aimed at areas difficult for any single Institute to address
on its own. See About the NIH Common Fund, NIH, https://commonfund.nih.gov
[https://perma.cc/GX3T-GUTX] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
117. A Program Announcement is “a formal statement about a new or ongoing
extramural activity or program. It may serve as a reminder of continuing interest in a research
area, describe modification in an activity or program, and/or invite applications for grant
support.” Glossary & Acronym List: Program Announcement (PA), NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/
grants/glossary.htm#ProgramAnnouncement(PA) [https://perma.cc/Z6XH-GBTV] (last
visited Mar. 11, 2019).
118. A Request for Application is “a formal statement that solicits grant or cooperative
agreement applications in a well-defined scientific area to accomplish specific program
objectives.” Glossary & Acronym List: Request for Application (RFA), NIH,
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/glossary.htm [https://perma.cc/NG99-9QUN] (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019).
119. Id. An RFA can also solicit cooperative agreement applications. Id.
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available, how many grants it expects to fund, and other logistical details.120
The process of seeking applications and thereby setting innovation target
areas is markedly more complicated than suggested by the critique of the grant
system. There is some truth to the idea that bureaucrats are making decisions;
the staff of various institutes and centers are involved in setting priorities to
determine what sorts of innovation may be funded, and in crafting the actual
RFAs and Program Announcements that formally invite grant applications.
And “the government,” writ large, can influence what areas are funded:
Congress can appropriate funds for particular projects (and, indeed,
appropriates funds separately for each Institute, giving it a chance to prioritize
the different broad missions), and the White House has been closely involved
in establishing large-scale research programs.121 Broad political controversies
can also informally shape researcher behavior.122 But this is far from the whole
story. The Parent Announcements are broad, standing invitations to seek
funding for whatever projects a researcher thinks worthy of funding that fits
within that capacious mission of the NIH, and a majority of research or
training applications submitted to the NIH fall within such investigatorinitiated categories.123 And even for the more focused Program
Announcements and RFAs, practicing scientific researchers are involved in
crafting the rationale for, and the shape of, solicitation for grant applications.
b) Peer Review
The second key funding issue involves individual projects: once areas of
targeted innovation have been broadly identified, what specific projects should
be funded, and who should undertake those projects? These two questions are
tightly blended in the NIH’s peer review system, the heart of the NIH’s grant
evaluation system. The NIH is required by law to use peer review to evaluate
grants.124 About 25,000 peer scientists review about 80,000 grant applications

120. See id.
121. See supra note 115, at 299–300 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Joanna Kempner, The Chilling Effect: How Do Researchers React to Controversy?, 6
PLOS MED. 1571, 1571 (2009) (finding that among researchers whose NIH grant proposals
had been criticized as wasteful in a “highly publicized political controversy,” about half later
removed controversial words from grants and about a quarter avoided controversial topics);
Rebecca Hersher, Climate Scientists Watch Their Words, Hoping to Stave Off Funding Cuts, NPR
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/29/564043596/
climate-scientists-watch-their-words-hoping-to-stave-off-funding-cuts
[https://perma.cc/
R5ED-4MDT] (noting a sharp decrease in the phrase “climate change” in NSF grants in
reaction to the Trump administration’s hostility to the topic).
123. See NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at I-46.
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 289a (2018).
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each year in two stages:125 “initial peer review” for “scientific and technical
merit” and Advisory Council Review, which includes broader policy
considerations.126 An application must be recommended for approval by both
levels to be recommended for final funding by an Institute.127 Of the two, the
initial peer review is far more important for individual grants.
Initial peer review focuses on the science alone. When researchers submit
a grant application, the NIH’s Center for Scientific Review checks the
application for technical details and conformance with the Funding
Opportunity Announcement, then assigns the application to a Scientific
Review Group for initial peer review.128
Scientific Review Groups (Groups) are mostly made up of nongovernment scientists with relevant scientific and technical expertise.129
However, each Group is led by an NIH staff scientist, known as a Scientific
Review Officer, who recruits reviewers, assigns applications to reviewers for
pre-meeting review, and prepares summaries of the grant’s evaluation.130 The
non-federal scientist peer reviewers receive the grant applications several
weeks in advance of a peer review meeting.131 Each is assigned particular
applications to pre-review, which includes writing a critique and scoring the
application preliminarily.132
Grant applications are scored on several criteria. The most important is
“overall impact” (“likelihood for the project to exert a sustained, powerful
influence on the research field(s) involved”).133 Several other criteria are scored;
for research project grants, these are typically:134

125. NIH, NIH PEER REVIEW: GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS (2019).
126. Peer
Review,
NIH,
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer-review.htm
[https://perma.cc/K6ZK-WAEP] (last visited arch 11, 2019) [hereinafter NIH, Peer Review].
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. The NIH provides copious guidance to its peer reviewers, including policies
on avoiding conflicts of interest, evaluating proposal significance and impact, evaluating
researcher plans to share data, and evaluating the rigor and transparency of a proposal. See
generally Consolidated List of Reviewer Documents, NIH https://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer/
reviewer_guidelines.htm [https://perma.cc/E5KX-GF8S] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
133. NIH, Peer Review, supra note 126.
134. See Definitions of Criteria and Considerations for Research Project Grant
(RPG/X01/R01/R03/R21/R33/R34) Critiques, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer/
critiques/rpg_D.htm#rpg_01 [https://perma.cc/9FGG-2V88] (last visited March 11, 2019)
[hereinafter NIH, Definitions of Criteria]. Additional criteria may be provided for different grant
types. Id.
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Significance: scientific basis for the project, and how it could change and
improve the field;
Investigator(s): experience and suitability of the researchers for the
project, including experience and training (for young investigators) and
demonstrated accomplishments (for established researchers);
Innovation: novel (in the field or broadly) paradigms, interventions,
approaches, etc., to “challenge and seek to shift current research or clinical
practice paradigms”;
Approach: “well-reasoned and appropriate” “strategy, methodology, and
analyses” and design of the project;
Environment: supportive scientific environment, including institutional
support.135
The five criteria listed above, as well as overall impact, are numerically
scored.136 Additional criteria involve protections for human subjects, diversity,
animal policies, and others, but these criteria are not scored.137
Once the assigned peer reviewers have given initial scores, those scores
(typically just the overall impact score) are used to determine which
applications will be discussed at the Group meeting; applications that do not
make the cut (typically the bottom half) are “not discussed” and will not be
funded.138 At the meeting, the remaining grant applications receive a final
overall impact score from each non-conflicted Group reviewer; these scores
are averaged to obtain a final total score, which ranges from 10 (high impact)
to 90 (low impact).139
The second level of peer review is by the National Advisory Council or
National Advisory Board (together, “Council”) associated with the potentially
funding Institute.140 Each Council comprises both scientists and public
representatives with an interest in the scientific subject or disease.141 The
Council does not typically review individual grants; instead, NIH staff
construct a grant-funding plan based on the results of the initial peer review

135. Id.
136. See Notice NOT-OD-09-024: Enhancing Peer Review: The NIH Announces New Scoring
Procedures for Evaluation of Research Applications Received for Potential FY2010 Funding, NIH,
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not-od-09-024.html
[https://perma.cc/
CT4T-8ETT] (noting changes to grant scoring system from a 1-to-5 scale with 0.1 point
increments to a 1-to-9 integer scale) (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
137. NIH, Peer Review, supra note 126.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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scores, and the Council makes recommendations for changes.142 The Council
nominally considers broader issues, including the mission of the Institute, the
balance of funding between different recipients, and priorities of different
research areas.143 However, Council review, while “not perfunctory,” is “highly
deferential to study section recommendations.”144
Finally, the Director of the Institute makes the actual funding decision.
This decision can be delegated, and often final decisions are made by units
within an Institute (such as Divisions or Programs).145
Despite the formal three-stage process—initial peer review for scientific
merit, Council review for broader considerations, and a Director’s final call—
in practice, the initial peer review almost completely determines the outcome
for the vast majority of grants.146 Applications are ranked by their final overall
score, and Institute staff determine, based on available funding, what score is
necessary for a grant to be funded by the Institute: the “payline.”147 For
instance, if the payline for a grant is thirty, grants with final overall scores of
thirty or below are typically funded, and applications with scores above thirty
are not funded.148 Paylines may also be expressed as percentile scores among
all submitted grants. For many Institutes, the payline is publicly announced;
the National Cancer Institute, for instance, announced that for 2016 it would
fund R01 grants up to the 10th percentile and R21 exploratory grants up to the
7th percentile “without additional review.”149 There is some flexibility around
paylines—the paylines are typically different for less-established researchers,

142. See id.
143. For instance, the Council specially reviews individual grant applications where the
investigator already receives over $1 million in NIH grant funding, though this review does
not constitute a funding cap. Id.
144. McGarity, supra note 91, at 10 (citing DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARD J. HACKETT,
PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER REVIEW AND U.S. SCIENCE POLICY 2 (1990)).
145. See Brian A. Jacob & Lars Lefgren, The Impact of Research Grant Funding on Scientific
Productivity, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1168, 1169 (2011).
146. See id. (“Generally, grants are awarded solely on the basis of priority score.”); see also
NCI
Funding
Policy
for
RPG
Awards
FY16, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
https://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/grantspolicies/FinalFundLtrArchive/finalfundltr2016.htm
[https://perma.cc/AK7F-75UQ] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) [hereinafter NCI, 2016 Funding
Strategy] (“Peer review evaluation of scientific merit will remain the primary consideration in
these funding decisions, which will be made by NCI Scientific Program Leaders . . . following
discussions with program staff.”).
147. See generally NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at I-73 (noting that
some Institutes and Centers publish their paylines).
148. See Jacob & Lefgren, supra note 145, at 1171 (“[T]he realized cutoff in each situation
depends on the level of funding for a particular institute, year, and mechanism, along with the
number and quality of applications submitted.”).
149. NCI, 2016 Funding Strategy, supra note 146.
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for instance,150 and final funding decisions may involve a small fraction of
“out-of-order” funding based on other priorities of the particular Institute’s
administration.151 But the vast majority of grants have their fates determined
by the initial peer review for scientific and technical merit. This helps address
concerns of cronyism and corruption because panels of peers, not officials,
largely determine funding.
Overall, then, the system differs markedly from the simplified version
presented in the critique of grants. Are government bureaucrats making
uninformed decisions about what scientific projects get funded? Not really. It
is true that staff and leaders at the NIH are involved in the process: the Center
for Scientific Review processes initial applications and assigns them to review
groups, Scientific Review Officers run the Scientific Review Groups in the
initial peer review, NIH staff collates scores and prepares funding reports for
the Councils, and NIH Directors or their delegates make the final decisions.
But the key determinant of funding is initial peer review. Several scientists with
expertise in the field read applications; determine how they fare on
significance, investigator qualifications, innovation, approach, scientific
environment, and overall impact on the field; and write up scores, critiques,
and reasoning. Then those scientists meet, discuss the most promising grants,
and decide their final scores—which projects are most worthy. That’s mostly
it. Grants are ranked, and the grants judged most worthy are funded until the
funding runs out (with a bit of wiggle room).
While the process does not involve the market aggregating private
information held by firms, it does involve the aggregation of relevant
information. The grant applicants themselves disclose what they know of the
innovation’s potential value and their own capacities in the grant application.
Peer reviewers see that information, have their own information about the
field, and often can directly compare projects proposed by different
researchers in the same field. And agency personnel can provide broader
perspectives about government information. This process is a far cry from the
notion of an uninformed bureaucrat simply sitting in a room and “picking

150. See id. (noting that grants submitted by “early stage investigators” (discussed infra at
Section IV.A.1) would be funded up to the 12th percentile, rather than the 10th percentile for
other investigators); Jacob & Lefgren, supra note 145, at 1171 (noting that “there is clearly
evidence of out-of-order funding. In [their] sample [of grant applications], 4% of individuals
who scored above the cutoff received the grant, while 9% of those below the cutoff did not
receive a grant or declined the award”).
151. See Jacob & Lefgren, supra note 145, at 1169 (“Institute directors have the discretion
to fund applications out of order on the basis of their subjective judgment of application
quality, or other factors such as how an application fits with the institute’s mission or whether
there were a large number of applications submitted on a similar topic.”).
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winners.”
c) Concerns of Peer Involvement in Funding Decisions
Peer review of grants certainly brings its own challenges, including bias,
conformity, and accurate prediction, some of which parallel problems raised
with peer review of research publications.152 First, bias is frequently raised as a
concern. Grant applications are generally not anonymous, not least because
the funding decision depends in part on the qualifications of the researchers
seeking funding. Because peer scientists are involved in deciding which
projects receive funding, their decisions could be biased by personal
animosity,153 prejudices against the personal characteristics of the researcher
seeking funding,154 competitiveness against researchers in the same field,155
political pressure,156 or otherwise. Studies have found varying levels of
evidence for such bias.157
Second, peer review may create subtle pressure against innovative science:
peers may prefer grant proposals that do not rock the scientific boat.158
Thomas Kuhn, an influential sociologist of science, noted that the scientific
model involves communities of experts making their own decisions about
what research would progress.159 Nicolas Rasmussen notes that leaving those
decisions in the hands of top scientists can have the effect of concentrating

152. See generally CHUBIN & HACKETT, supra note 144 (providing a review of peer review).
153. See McGarity, supra note 91, at 5.
154. See, e.g., Erika C. Hayden, Racial Bias Haunts NIH Grants, 527 NATURE 286 (2015)
(finding evidence of racial bias for NIH grant funding); Anna Kaatz et al., Analysis of National
Institutes of Health R01 Application Critiques, Impact, and Criteria Scores: Does the Sex of the Principal
Investigator Make a Difference?, 91 ACAD. MED. 1080 (2016) (finding little bias for R01 initial
grants, but bias against women for R01 renewals).
155. See McGarity, supra note 91, at 52–54 (noting the potential for financial or research
conflicts of interest). But see Managing Conflict of Interest in NIH Peer Review of Grants and Contracts,
NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer/peer_coi.htm [https://perma.cc/NEN5-L447]
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (describing NIH policies for avoiding peer reviewer conflict of
interest and providing links to several relevant policies).
156. See McGarity, supra note 91, at 7.
157. See Simon Wessely, Peer Review of Grant Applications: What Do We Know?, 352 LANCET
301, 304 (1998) (reviewing sixty-one papers on bias in grant applications and concluding, “[t]he
main charge against peer review, that of institutional or sex bias, is generally unfounded, with
a few exceptions”). But see Hayden, supra note 154 (noting evidence of racial bias); Kaatz, supra
note 154 (noting evidence of sex bias).
158. See, e.g., Joshua M. Nicholson & John P.A. Ioannidis, Conform and Be Funded, 492
NATURE 34 (2012); Michal Shur-Ofry, Nonlinear Innovation, 61 MCGILL L.J. 563, 577–78 (2016)
(describing resistance among grantors to paradigm-shifting innovation).
159. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 37 (2d ed. 1962);
see also NICOLAS RASMUSSEN, GENE JOCKEYS: LIFE SCIENCE AND THE RISE OF BIOTECH
ENTERPRISE 24 (2014) (discussing Kuhn).
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scientific credit, power, and money.160 McGarity draws out the implications of
this for peer review of grant applications: “An important battleground in the
war between the [new and old scientific] paradigms is the discretionary grants
process. People who have spent their careers conducting research aimed at
bolstering and extending the dominant paradigm are reluctant to direct
resources toward research aimed at destroying it.”161 There may therefore be a
preference toward more “mainstream” research proposals over those which
buck convention.162 Frischmann also notes this concern, arguing that
innovation may suffer because of competitiveness of the grant system and the
need for relatively “safe” proposals to ensure funding.163
The NIH explicitly fights back against any tendency to prioritize “safe”
science; reviewers are required to numerically score a grant proposal for
innovation, including the question, “Does the application challenge and seek
to shift current research or clinical practice paradigms by utilizing novel
theoretical concepts, approaches or methodologies, instrumentation, or
interventions?”164 In addition, grant programs can specifically prioritize
boundary-crossing interdisciplinary work, as described below.165 But the
concern persists.
Third, some doubt whether peer review is accurate: is it good at sorting
out good ideas and grant applications from bad ones? The answer to this seems
to be a cautious and qualified “yes.” Figuring out whether peer review
accurately identifies projects most likely to succeed is challenging; basic
research, in particular, is typically likely to fail, and paradigm-changing research
is perhaps the most likely to fail, almost by definition.166 Evidence suggests that
peer review can probably discriminate sound applications from seriously
flawed applications.167 However, beyond that distinction, scholars debate
whether better-scored grants are actually more productive.168

160. RASMUSSEN, supra note 159, at 24.
161. McGarity, supra note 91, at 41.
162. Id. at 40; see Pedraza-Fariña & Bair, supra note 17, at 1097 (identifying this problem
and describing it as an anti-innovation “research priority norm”).
163. Frischmann, supra note 31, at 389 n.184 (citing STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
SCIENCE, 105TH CONG., 1ST SESS., UNLOCKING OUR FUTURE: TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL
SCIENCE POLICY 19–20 (Comm. Print 1998)).
164. NIH, Definitions of Criteria, supra note 134.
165. See infra Section IV.B.3.
166. See Nelson, supra note 25, at 304.
167. See Ferric C. Fang, Anthony Bowen & Arturo Casadevall, NIH Peer Review Percentile
Scores are Poorly Predictive of Grant Productivity, 5 ELIFE e13323 (2016).
168. Compare id. (finding little relationship between percentile score and grant
productivity), with Danielle Li & Leila Agha, Big Names or Big Ideas: Do Peer-Review Panels Select
the Best Science Proposals?, 348 SCIENCE 434 (2015) (finding a strong relationship between those
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Overall, deep peer involvement, whether in the process of seeking
applications and therefore identifying areas of innovation (broad or narrow)
or in the process of choosing projects and individuals to fund, casts a
substantially different light on the grant-funding process. Peer involvement in
picking projects has its flaws; it might involve bias, it might suggest safe
science, and it is certainly imperfect at identifying the best projects for funding.
Similarly, the process of identifying areas of potential innovation, which relies
both on peer involvement and on targeting by agency or other government
actors with an eye toward social welfare priorities (or patronage, or pork), has
its own flaws and idiosyncrasies. But of course, so does the principal
alternative—a market-based system that relies on the incentives of private
actors to decide what innovation is best to pursue, not based on evaluations
of scientific merit or social welfare value, but on a calculus of what profits are
appropriable through an imperfect intellectual property system or otherwise.169
Grants aren’t perfect; they’re just different, and more interestingly different
than is often assumed.
2. Unaccountable Ex Ante Incentives
Grants provide complex incentives for innovative effort. Several accounts
critique grants as providing essentially only ex ante incentives, which may be
less effective in motivating research effort because the innovator has fewer
incentives to work efficiently.170 As with grant funding, however, grant
spending is more complicated. First, the NIH uses some modest tools to
ensure that researchers are in fact working on what they proposed. Generally
applicable anti-fraud laws also limit what researchers can do with government
money, but typically apply only to behavior that significantly deviates from the
purposes of the grant.171 Second, and far more important, grants are not one
measures).
169. See, e.g., Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 43, at 1907 (arguing that “patent rights have
the potential to predictably and systematically distort private investment decisions over
innovations by overstating the value of highly excludable information goods and understating
the value of highly nonexcludable ones”); Ofer Tur-Sinai, Technological Progress and Well-Being,
48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 156–59 (2016) (cataloging scholarly critiques of patents and markets
as an innovation allocation mechanism); id. at 161–75 (arguing that even if patents and markets
did well in satisfying preferences, they still do a relatively poor job of increasing well-being).
170. See supra Section II.B.
171. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2018) (prohibiting making false
claims); United States ex rel. Feldman v. van Gorp, 697 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding fraud
when an NIH-funded fellowship program at Cornell Weill Medical College deviated
substantially from the grant application and continuing reports); U.S. Office of Inspector
Gen., Grant Fraud, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/
fraud/grant/index.asp [https://perma.cc/96XZ-TWEW] (describing grant fraud generally).
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off events: researchers work as repeat players within a grant ecosystem where
getting the next grant is an ongoing career imperative, and getting that next
grant depends on productive outcomes from the current grant.172
a) Progress and Reporting Obligations
Grants do come with some continuing obligations that allow monitoring
and control by the NIH. Rarely, grants have explicit requirements for progress
that the NIH requires before additional funding is disbursed. For instance, a
request for applications for high-risk, high-reward HIV vaccine research grants
states that each application must include explicit Go/No-Go success criteria
to be evaluated by the end of the second year of the nominally four-year grant;
if the Go criteria are not met, the grant winds down with substantially
decreased funding.173 The center grants supporting the Human Genome
Project also had robust accountability and control mechanisms to help drive a
broad, expensive, collaborative enterprise.174 But these mechanisms are
unusual; most NIH grants include little more than reporting requirements.175
The NIH usually requires that grant recipients submit financial and
progress reports at least annually.176 Recipients must also disclose whether any
potentially patentable inventions were made in the funded project, both under
the Bayh-Dole Act and independently under NIH policy.177 Grant recipients

172. In addition, of course, the grant system does not exist in isolation; researchers who
produce patentable inventions can patent them and receive some of the resulting royalties. See
supra notes 63–66 (discussing the Bayh-Dole Act). I view this incentive as one created by the
patent system, however, and not as one internal to the grant system.
173. Request for Application PAR-16-171: Innovation for HIV Vaccine Discovery (R01), NAT’L
INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pafiles/PAR-16-171.html [https://perma.cc/TXC6-MK5M] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter, NIAID, HIV RFA].
174. See STEPHEN HILGARTNER, REORDERING LIFE: KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL IN
THE GENOMICS REVOLUTION 96–98 (2017) (noting that genome sequencing centers would be
subject to annual progress reports, frequent scientific reviews, meetings with NIH Center
Directors, and rigorous evaluations on which future funding would be contingent); id. at 98–
104 (detailing scientific evaluation strategies).
175. See NIAID, HIV RFA, supra note 173 (“[A]pplications should be very different from
conventional investigator-initiated R01 applications . . . . Applications that do not include
Go/No-Go decision criterion/criteria will be considered incomplete and will not be
reviewed.”).
176. See NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at IIA-135. For many rewards,
including R01 grants, financial reports need only be submitted at the end of the full grant
period. Id. at IIA-125–26.
177. See id. at IIA-130; see also 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2018). But see Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N.
Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded Research, 30 NAT. BIOTECHNOLOGY 953
(2012) (noting that many Bayh-Dole reporting mandates go unfollowed).
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are also subject to audit.178 Failure to follow reporting requirements, or failure
to comply with other terms of the grant, can theoretically result in disallowing
costs, withholding future grant awards, suspending the grant, or even
terminating the grant.179 At least in part, these reporting requirements should
encourage grant recipients to work toward the goals of the grant, in contrast
to a purely ex ante award with no oversight or reporting mechanisms at all.
b) Repeat Players
The most important reporting of grant progress comes not in response to
the current grant but in applying for the next grant. Grants terms are measured
in years; researcher careers are measured in decades (or, at least, most
researchers hope so). Failure to get subsequent grants can result in the
downsizing of a lab or the end of a career, making researchers repeat players.180
As Gallini and Scotchmer noted, the “moral hazard” of non-contingent ex ante
funding for a single grant “is overcome because future grants are contingent on
previous success.”181 They argue that in practice, grants “operate much like
prizes, with the wrinkle that a researcher must convince the sponsor in advance
that his output might be worthy of a prize. For this purpose, his reputation
might suffice, and in some cases, much of the research has already been
completed.”182
NIH grant-funding policy follows this pattern. The NIH scores grant
applications on five main criteria, including “Investigator(s)” (the scientist
running the project). “If [non-established], do they have appropriate
experience and training? If established, have they demonstrated an ongoing
record of accomplishments that have advanced their field(s)?”183 In addition,
many NIH grant types effectively require substantial preliminary data, which

178. See NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at IIA-143–46.
179. See id. at IIA-135. Grant termination is rare, though NIH does not track such
occurrences. See Jef Akst, Wanted: Records of Revoked Grants, SCIENTIST (Jan. 20, 2010),
https://www.the-scientist.com/the-nutshell/wanted-records-of-revoked-grants-43553
[https://perma.cc/6EB7-GM4X]; cf. Jef Akst, 3 Calif Stem Cell Grants Revoked, SCIENTIST
(Nov. 3, 2009), https://www.the-scientist.com/the-nutshell/3-calif-stem-cell-grants-revoked43763 [https://perma.cc/3TPS-QBGC] (noting the revocation of three grants by the
California Institute of Regenerative Medicine for insufficient progress).
180. See Adam Ruben, Another Tenure-Track Scientist Bites the Dust, SCIENCE (Jul. 19, 2017),
http://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2017/07/another-tenure-track-scientist-bites-dust
[https://perma.cc/777E-4M9V] (giving an example of how failure to get a grant can end a
career).
181. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 38, at 54.
182. Id.; see also Hanson, supra note 52, at 5 (“[C]ompetitive grants, which fund much of
today’s best basic research, can be viewed as a small prize for thinking up a promising topic,
coupled with a larger but still moderate grant for working on that topic.”).
183. NIH, Definitions of Criteria, supra note 134.
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serves to demonstrate (a) the project’s feasibility; (b) the researcher’s training
and ability to generate data; and (c) the researcher’s willingness to spend
resources on the project even before this grant is funded.184 This last point is
in some tension with the idea that grants help free researchers from capital
constraints,185 but reinforces the serial nature of grant funding. Productivity
under one grant—experiments conducted, expertise acquired, data generated,
and papers published—is relevant to the NIH in deciding whether to fund the
next grant, whether a competitive extension of the same project, a new grant
for a related project, or an entirely different project led by the same
experienced, productive researcher.
Figure 1 illustrates this pattern. It schematically shows the grants that
might be received by a (rather successful) hypothetical researcher; we’ll call her
Jenn.
Figure 1: Schematic of serial and parallel grants


184. Many but not all grant types require preliminary data; for instance, R01 grants require
fairly substantial preliminary data, but grants focused on small studies or phased innovation
(R00, R21, and R21/33 grants) need not include preliminary data, particularly if the projects
are exploratory or pilot studies. See id.
185. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 308. Without initial resources, securing
preliminary results to obtain grant funding can be hard to do. The repeat nature of grants,
discussed in the next Section, somewhat obviates this concern, with two caveats. First, it does
not apply to initial entry to the grant system, and therefore may penalize new innovators who
lack the resources to generate preliminary data on their first projects (especially if, unlike the
example to follow, they do not follow a research-intensive path into becoming an innovator).
Second, it may shape the direction of research, because preliminary results may not support
future projects that are very far afield from the earlier work.
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Initially, Jenn is supported by an F32 postdoctoral fellowship, which
supports postdoctoral research and training. Jenn is working on Project Blue,
under the direction of the head of her lab, Durona (the fact that Jenn is not
the principal investigator is indicated by the stippling in the figure); Durona
also certainly has her own funding, which supports Project Blue. Jenn uses the
data acquired from that work to propose a related project, Project Purple; she
applies for a K99/R00 Career Development Award, designed to help her
transition into the role of an independent researcher. Getting this type of twotiered award is contingent on Jenn’s baseline qualifications, but also on how
well she has done in her earlier work. It is therefore extremely challenging to
get a K99/R00 grant without a record of peer-reviewed scientific publications
(as well as a solid research plan and the other requirements for a grant).186 Jenn
gets the combination grant, and for two years she is funded by the K99 as a
postdoctoral fellow in Durona’s lab, still working under her mentorship (as the
K99 requires). Then, contingent on Jenn’s appointment as an independent, full
time faculty member, she receives R00 funding to continue work on a
broadened Project Purple in her own lab.
Two years later, Project Purple has borne fruit; the main project has
developed, resulting in publications, more data, and more possibilities, and
Jenn is ready to expand the project substantially. She applies for and receives
an R01 Research Project Grant to continue and expand the main thrust of
Project Purple: five years of substantial funding, enough to support a doctoral
student and a postdoctoral fellow. But again, getting the R01 depends in large
part on Jenn’s research productivity while supported by the R00. Five years
after getting the R01 for Project Purple, it expires; Jenn applies for a renewal
(R01’), which is subject to the normal competitive grant process. For the
continuation of Project Purple, Jenn’s lab, and Jenn’s own scientific career,
productive work under each grant is essential. This is not to say that success is
essential; the NIH knows that innovative research often fails. But future grants
depend on actually doing the work.
Cross-grant contingency is not only serial but also parallel: many
researchers work on multiple grants simultaneously. In an academic lab, the
principal investigator who heads the lab may have working with him multiple
doctoral students, multiple postdoctoral fellows, and perhaps a few
technicians, working on different projects and supported by different grants—

186. The overall success rate for 2017 K99 applications was 23.4%, but that already
excludes all the candidates who did not apply because their credentials were insufficient. See
NIH, CAREER DEVELOPMENT AWARDS: APPLICATIONS, AWARDS, SUCCESS RATES, AND
FUNDING, BY INSTITUTE/CENTER AND ACTIVITY CODE (2018).
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all of which partially support the principal investigator herself. Typically, these
grants will be staggered in time. Even if productive results from one grant are
not directly prerequisite for a staggered grant on a different project, outcomes
such as papers, awards, expertise, and prizes all matter in determining whether
the investigator is likely to succeed in the parallel project, and therefore
whether the funder should approve that other application.
Figure 1 also shows this dynamic. At the end of Jenn’s R00, she has
developed another interesting line of research, and applies for an R03 Small
Grant to pursue it. Unfortunately, Project Red doesn’t pan out and two years
later the funding runs out. Meanwhile, Project Purple continues; a couple of
years later, it suggests another line of inquiry, and Jenn applies for and receives
an R21 Exploratory/Developmental Grant for Project Navy (that grant
requires no preliminary data, but she uses some evidence from Project Purple
to support the application anyway). After two years, she has enough data from
the R21 on Project Navy to get the R33 Exploratory/Developmental Grant
Phase II. For each of these parallel applications, Jenn doesn’t have the same
sort of robust earlier data that needs to underline the serial line of Project
Purple grants above. But when the Scientific Review Group conducts its initial
peer review of her application,187 it will see what she published in the course
of her Project Purple work, expertise she has acquired, the experience of any
postdoctoral fellows she has hired to do work, and similar progress markers.
They all matter for her success as a researcher, and they all matter to peer
reviewers for other grants.
In sum, while the ex ante nature of any one grant largely follows the critique
that grants have limited ability to drive post-award researcher effort, no single
grant paints the whole picture. Instead, researchers are repeat players in a
system where multiple grants matter, both in parallel and serially, on the same
or related projects. In this broader context, the success or productivity of work
under a particular grant has far-reaching consequences on future funding, both
for the researcher and for others working in her lab.
3. Problematic Risk Allocation
The third critique suggests that grants poorly allocate downside and upside
risk between the funder and the recipient; a more comprehensive
understanding of what benefits and costs are relevant to the NIH suggests that
this critique, too, is incomplete. Of course, much of the point of grants is that
the government explicitly does not benefit directly from successful projects (if



187. See supra Section II.B.1.
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it did, these instruments would be procurement contracts instead of grants).188
Instead, grants have long been considered a way to create public goods from
which the government does not directly benefit. Nevertheless, some have
raised the concern that the allocation of downside and upside risk is
problematic.189 Poorly allocated risk can raise problems in both directions. If
downside risk (that is, the risk of failure) is allocated entirely to the
government, the researcher has decreased incentives to avoid failure. And if
upside risk is allocated entirely to the researcher, the government may not reap
much from its spending. Taken together, these two sides of risk allocation
could also encourage researchers to pursue overly risky plans, since they
capture most of the benefit of success but face little of the cost of failure. A
richer conception of the grant system and the NIH’s general mission reduces
all three concerns.
Downside risk invites the most straightforward rebuttal. The government
does not bear downside risk alone. Researchers also face downside risks from
project failures. While the NIH does not require success from its funded
projects—science is risky, and innovative science more so—nevertheless it is
easier to generate data, and especially to publish in prestigious peer-reviewed
journals, if research achieves its stated goals. This bias in favor of positive
results has its own powerful negative consequences for science,190 but it does
keep some of the risk of failure squarely on the researcher. Failing to receive
or renew grant funding results in a range of consequences that can hit a
researcher hard, including shame among peers, the inability to hire (or the need
to fire) subordinates, denial of tenure or promotion, and the end of a lab and
a career.191
The question of upside risk allocation shifts substantially when taking into
account the NIH’s mission.192 Consider an expensive NIH investment in
research that leads to the development of a new drug. In all likelihood, a drug
company licenses the exclusive rights to that drug, takes it to market, and reaps

188. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Section II.A.3.
190. An exploration of the negative repercussions of the publication bias for favorable
results is fascinating but outside the scope of this Article. For an introduction to the area, see
Michal Shur-Ofry, Access-to-Error, 34 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 357 (2016); John P.A.
Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLoS MED. 696 (2005); see also Jacob
S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 852–65 (2017) (discussing
the related problem of irreproducibility in science).
191. See Ruben, supra note 180.
192. See Mission and Goals, NIH, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/missiongoals [https://perma.cc/8WD4-9Q5D] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) [hereinafter NIH, Mission
and Goals].
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billions in profit while the NIH and the government see no profits; in fact, the
latter pays billions to the drug company through public health insurance.193
This dynamic is subject to a powerful critique—why doesn’t the government
benefit from its grant funding?194 Simply put, it does.195
There are several upsides to research that the government is well
positioned to capture. The simplest is that research may solve a public
problem; a new vaccine will keep people from getting sick, and the government
may benefit both monetarily (paying less to take care of sick people) and in its
role as representative of the public (which benefits by being healthier).
A second, well-recognized benefit is that research generates information
that is a public good with substantial externalities; this is perhaps the strongest
justification for grants generally.196 This is true both for basic research, the
value of which is very hard to capture but which enables other innovation, and
for applied research, which creates the same sort of knowledge spillovers.197
Generating this knowledge accords with the NIH’s mission, which includes
“expand[ing] the knowledge base in medical and associated sciences.”198 More
broadly, the government in its role as social welfare coordinator and social

193. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: NIH-PRIVATE
SECTOR PARTNERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT IN TAXOL 13 (2003) (“NIH Invested Heavily
in Taxol-Related Research, but Federal Financial Benefits Have Been Limited.”). While Taxol
related from a cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA) rather than a grant,
the argument is essentially parallel, and recurs today. See, e.g., Matt Richtel & Andrew Pollack,
Harnessing the U.S. Taxpayer to Fight Cancer and Make Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/health/harnessing-the-us-taxpayer-to-fight-cancerand-make-profits.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/5349-B9C7] (asking, about government
investment in CAR-T immunotherapy for cancer, “Are taxpayers getting a good deal?”).
194. See Mariana Mazzucato, How Taxpayers Prop up Big Pharma, and How to Cap That, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1027-mazzucato-bigpharma-prices-20151027-story.html [https://perma.cc/N7FS-6XU5]; Gerard Anderson, Big
Pharma
Should
Support
the
NIH,
BALT.
SUN
(Apr.
17,
2015),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-medical-innovations-act20150417-story.html [https://perma.cc/6PRP-8WNH].
195. Issues of drug pricing are complex and far outside the scope of this piece. For an
overview, see generally Ari B. Friedman & Janet Weiner, What’s the Story with Drug Prices?, PENN
LDI (May 30, 2016), https://ldi.upenn.edu/healthpolicysense/what%E2%80%99s-storydrug-prices [https://perma.cc/7FCT-7GRU].
196. See Nelson, supra note 25, at 302–04.
197. See Frischmann, supra note 31, at 389 (“The uncontrollable risks are borne by the
government and are, in a sense, considered small because spillovers are welcome.”); cf. Danielle
Li, Pierre Azoulay & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Applied Value of Public Investments in Biomedical
Research, 356 SCIENCE 78, 78–80 (2017) (finding that around 10% of NIH grants are directly
cited by patents and 30% are cited in publications that are themselves cited in patents; for
patents on approved drugs, the rates are around 1% and 5%, respectively).
198. NIH, Mission and Goals, supra note 192.



40

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34:1

representative realizes the benefits of those knowledge spillovers.
The public good of knowledge spillovers, however, is broader than that
created by successful research. Negative information—what doesn’t work,
what paths are unproductive, and the like—is also useful information to both
the government as a whole and to the NIH in particular. Among other things,
it can help future grantees avoid fruitless research paths. Negative information
can also be difficult for private firms to capture.199
Finally, and this upside is less often acknowledged, a substantial goal for
the NIH is to build human and institutional capital in science. The NIH states
that one of its four goals is “to develop, maintain, and renew scientific human
and physical resources that will ensure the Nation’s capability to prevent
disease.”200 As a matter of both national and NIH policy, we want more trained
scientists around. Their knowledge and expertise helps drive innovation across
many fields. It is a positive outcome when the NIH funds, trains, and develops
scientists, even if research projects fail to produce immediately valuable
findings. Jacob and Lefgren find empirical evidence of successful grant-funded
development: receipt of a postdoctoral fellowship (NIH’s F32 grant) increases
the chance of a young scientist becoming a successful researcher by almost a
quarter.201
These two realities of downside and upside risk—that researchers do
suffer from failed projects and that even risky projects can generate negative
knowledge and human capital—address the concern that risk allocation will
push researchers toward overly risky research projects. However, even if risk
allocation does push researchers toward riskier projects, such an effect may be
justified for two reasons. First, a risk-allocation-based push toward riskier
research may counterbalance the possibility that grant-funders could prefer
“safer” research.202 Second, riskier research is likely to be a less attractive target
for private investment;203 to the extent that grant funding is especially

199. See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 43, at 1926–28 (noting the difficulty of capturing
the benefits of negative knowledge through patents). But see Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your
(Trade) Secrets: Knowledge Networks as Innovation Drivers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1597–98
(2017) (discussing firm ability to capture negative knowledge through trade secrecy).
200. NIH, Mission and Goals, supra note 192.
201. Brian A. Jacob & Lars Lefgren, The Impact of NIH Postdoctoral Training Grants on
Scientific Productivity, 40 RES. POL’Y 864, 873 (2011).
202. See Pierre Azoulay, Joshua S. Graff Zivin & Gustavo Manso, Incentives and creativity:
evidence from the academic life sciences, 42 RAND J. ECON. 527, 531 (2011) (noting NIH grant
funding incentives to pursue comparatively safe research). But see Hyunwoo Park, Jeongsik Lee
& Byung-Cheol Kim, Project selection in NIH: A natural experiment from ARRA, 44 RES. POL’Y
1145, 1158 (2015) (finding that NIH selects and funds riskier projects than expected).
203. Nelson, supra note 25, at 302–04.
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appropriate where private firms are unlikely to invest, riskier research needs
grant funding more.
***
The NIH’s vast system of grant funding reflects a richer and more complex
reality than is captured in common depictions and critiques of grants. Funding
decisions are not made principally by bureaucrats, but rather by panels of peer
scientific experts working in concert with agency staff. Researchers respond to
grant incentives not in a one-off, wholly ex ante vision that provides little drive
for efficiency or success, but rather in an iterative context of serial and parallel
grants where researchers are repeat players and success matters in receiving the
next essential grant. And grants do not allocate downside risk just to the
government and upside risk just to the grantee, but rather allocate a
combination of upside and downside risks to each party.
To be sure, the experience of the NIH does not demonstrate that these
critiques never hold—just that they do not hold at the NIH. A comparative
survey of different grant systems is outside the scope of this work. However,
there is reason to think that these insights are relatively generalizable. Peer
review is widely used to allocate grant funds.204 Where grant awards depend in
part on prior work, and where such awards are insufficient to individually
support an entire career, the repeat-player nature of the grant system should
create accountability mechanisms—and those two conditions are likely to hold
in most contexts. Finally, in most grant systems the recipients are likely to
experience some downside risk of project failure (for the same reason), and
the government to experience upside benefits.
Overall, grants are a more nuanced policy instrument than these critiques
reflect. The next Part describes how they can and do help promote a broad set
of innovation goals.
IV.

GRANTS AS INNOVATION LEVERS

Grants can do much more than is commonly recognized. In fact, they
already do. The two Sections of this Part each focus on one of the two key
comparative strengths of grants: creating incentives for goods whose social
welfare exceeds appropriable market value and directly supporting the
development of innovation enablers. The paradigmatic version of a grant, in

204. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 91, at 15–37 (describing peer review systems at the
National Science Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the National
Endowment for the Arts); Grimpe, supra note 85, at 1450–51 (noting the presence of peer
review in the German scientific grant system).
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the NIH context, does both of these things: an R01 basic research grant creates
information useful principally for later innovation, and markets value that
information for less than its social-welfare value. Because this is the
paradigmatic version, on which most conceptions of government grants are
based and which has been the dominant version throughout the rest of this
paper, I do not describe it in detail. Instead, this Section focuses on ways grants
can, do, and could promote innovation in non-paradigmatic ways.
A.

SOCIAL/MARKET VALUE MISMATCHES

Grants provide a useful tool to create incentives where social value exceeds
appropriable market value. This comparative strength neatly inverts the lauded
ability of patents and other exclusivity mechanisms to use market signals of
social value. Patents, the argument goes, are useful and efficient innovation
incentives because the value a firm can realize from a patented innovation
increases with the social value of the innovation, as measured by the market
price and demand for that innovation.205 But of course that argument doesn’t
always hold. Sometimes—some very important times—the value a firm can
capture through patents doesn’t reflect the social value of the innovation. One
such mismatch exists when market demand fails to reflect social value because
of a lack of willingness or ability to pay, as with treatments for diseases of the
poor. A second mismatch happens when, although market demand might
match social demand, existing appropriation mechanisms do not allow firms
to appropriate an innovation’s value—in effect, when existing intellectual
property mechanisms fail, as with medical diagnostics.206 Two sets of
requirements shape the NIH’s ability to drive innovation in these areas: the
Bayh-Dole Act’s requirements governing patent rights in innovations funded
by government grants and the NIH’s data-sharing requirements.
The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to retain rights to inventions funded
by federal grant money.207 Instead of the federal government retaining patent
rights, the Bayh-Dole Act lets universities or other nonprofits patent grantfunded innovations and license the patents to private firms for development.208
The scheme aims to promote the commercialization of inventions by private
firms, though the extent to which Bayh-Dole is necessary or beneficial is the

205. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 21; infra Section III.A.2. One can also describe infrastructure
investment, with its positive externalities, as a good whose appropriable market value does not
scale with its social value. Because grants target innovation infrastructure and other enablers
in a particularly distinct way, this opportunity is discussed in the next Section.
207. 35 U.S.C. § 202.
208. Id. For-profit grant recipients were added to the scheme by executive order. Exec.
Order No. 12618, 52 C.F.R. 48661 (1987).
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subject of considerable debate.209 The government retains the right to “march
in” and license the invention to another licensee if it is not made “reasonably
available” by the commercializing entity, and also retains a nonexclusive license
to make the invention available for government purposes.210 The march-in
right, however, has never been exercised,211 and the government’s own
licensing ability has long laid dormant, though recent scholarship has
attempted to revive it.212 As Ayres and Ouellete note, the Bayh-Dole regime
may have the effect of using public funding to create public goods, but then
creating rewards greater than needed to develop them in the private context.213
The NIH’s data-sharing policies also shape the availability of the fruits of
grant-funded research. NIH policy requires researchers to make peer-reviewed
publications resulting from grant-funded research freely available to the public
one year after initial publication.214 In addition, any “unique research
resources” made with NIH funding, such as new cell lines or genetic databases,
should “be made readily available for research purposes to qualified individuals
within the scientific community.”215 These policies help insure that grantfunded research becomes available but consequently limit the availability of
trade secrecy as a non-patent appropriation mechanism.


209. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 271 (2017) (describing the inefficiency of the Bayh-Dole system and
proposing a market mechanism for licensing of grant-funded inventions); Daniel J. Hemel &
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh-Dole Beyond Borders, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 282 (2017) (justifying
the Bayh-Dole regime as useful to respond to challenges of global freeriding); Frischmann,
supra note 31, at 399–413 (describing and critiquing the Bayh-Dole system of mixed grants and
privately licensed patents); Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Procuring Knowledge, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 1, 26 (2004) (noting that if the BayhDole Act solves any problem, it solves a problem with intellectual property law).
210. See 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018); see also Hannah Brennan et al., A
Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 275 (2016) (describing the history of § 1498 and arguing that the federal government
can use it today to buy generic versions of expensive drugs for far less than their list prices).
211. Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 209, at 321; see also Ryan Whalen, The Bayh-Dole Act &
Public Rights in Federally Funded Inventions: Will the Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, 109 NW. U. L.
REV. 1083 (2015).
212. See Brennan et al., supra note 210, at 280.
213. See supra note 209.
214. NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at IIA-116.
215. Id. at IIA-117; see Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants
and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed. Reg.
72090 (Dec. 23, 1999).
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1. Social Value Exceeding Market Value
Grants can fund innovation whose social welfare value exceeds the market
value of the product. Rachel Sachs notes,
Where the general population’s willingness and ability to pay for a
particular drug track the social value it contributes, patents are
thought to provide a relatively efficient way of incentivizing the
development of socially valuable drugs. But each of these factors—
willingness to pay and ability to pay—presents a well-known bias,
through which innovation incentives will be directed away from
certain types of treatments or diseases with high social salience.216

Willingness to pay creates a mismatch between social and private value.
For some innovations, social benefits exceed individual benefits; for example,
vaccines protect both the vaccinated individuals and others in society through
the process of herd immunity.217 Optimism bias may also decrease willingness
to pay because people don’t think they will get sick, and therefore underpay
for preventive measures, decreasing incentives for scientists to develop those
measures.218 Finally, short-term bias may cause individuals to systematically
undervalue expensive cures as opposed to ongoing treatments, which are
cheaper per instance but costlier over time.219 These distortions are not limited
to the biomedical context—individuals may undervalue vehicle safety
innovations that protect other drivers, upgrades that prevent house
deterioration down the road, and technologies like solar roofs that pay for

216. Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 168–69 (2016). Sachs suggests that insurance reimbursement may
suggest another avenue to create incentives for this type of innovation. Id. at 178–93. Amy
Kapczynski expands this argument generally in Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and
How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2012).
217. Sachs, supra note 216, at 169.
218. Id. at 169–70 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 303, 325 (2007)).
219. Id. at 170. As Sachs notes, the story of Sovaldi, a drug which cures Hepatitis C, which
itself primarily afflicts the poor, is somewhat miraculous. The typical story of drug market
incentives suggests that firms should not be especially interested in a drug that treats a disease
mostly afflicting those without substantial resources to pay, nor a drug that cures a chronic
disease rather than treating it profitably for a long time. Sovaldi is both, and even its frequentlycited high sticker price represents a substantial savings over current treatment options. See
Nicholas Bagley, Does It Break the Law to Charge a Lot for a Cure?, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST
(Jan. 28, 2016), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/does-it-break-the-law-tocharge-a-lot-for-a-cure/ [https://perma.cc/32RS-RCXB] (quoting an email from Rachel
Sachs to this effect). Outside biomedical innovation, climate change technology provides
tremendous social benefits in the future, but current costs make appropriate market valuation
of climate-change innovation challenging. See generally Ofer Tur-Sinai, Patents and Climate
Change: A Skeptic’s View, 48 ENV. L. REV. 211 (2018).
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themselves in long-term energy savings.220
Ability to pay also limits market incentives and makes them inadequate for
some socially valuable innovations. Consider Chagas, chikungunya, and other
Neglected Tropical Diseases, which in the United States afflict mostly the poor
and underinsured;221 mental illness is similarly more prevalent among those
populations.222 Because those who can’t pay for drugs can’t create market
demand, we should expect investment in treatments for those diseases to be
substantially less than the social value of such innovation.223
These are not the only ways that market demand can create problematic
incentives to pursue certain types of innovation. As Kevin Outterson has long
argued, antibiotic resistance is a tremendous problem of global scale, caused
in part by warped incentives for development of new antibiotics.224 Antibiotic
overuse limits the value of antibiotics for future users, but sellers of new
antibiotics profit more from selling lots of the antibiotics before resistance sets
in, rather than limiting their use.225 Accordingly, new antibiotics aren’t kept in
reserve, and society loses the very large benefit of having a robust arsenal of
last-resort antibiotics.226 Unfortunately but perhaps unsurprisingly, the past
several decades have seen little in the way of new antibiotics, and the looming
threat of global antibiotic resistance is increasingly worrisome.227
Grants can step in to support research in these areas of unmet need. In
2012, for instance, the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases
funded eight Tropical Medicine Research Centers through P50 Research
Center grants.228 The Centers are located in regions where the neglected
tropical diseases are prevalent: Brazil, India, Ghana, and Peru.229 These grants

220. See Howard Kunreuther & Elke U. Weber, Aiding Decision Making to Reduce the Impacts
of Climate Change, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 397, 402–04 (2014).
221. Sachs, supra note 216, at 154, 170–71.
222. Id. at 170–71.
223. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 39, at 1718 (“One of the problems of being poor is that
you do not have any money and therefore cannot spend a lot of money on drugs, even though
if you do not buy the drugs you may die.”).
224. See generally Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic
Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613 (2010).
225. Id. at 627.
226. Id.
227. See Dalia Deak et al., Progress in the Fight Against Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria? A Review
of U.S. Food and Drug Administration-Approved Antibiotics, 2010–2015, 165 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 363, 369–71 (2016) (noting disappointing development of new antibiotics).
228. Tropical Medicine Research Centers – Program Overview, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY &
INFECTIOUS
DISEASES,
https://www.niaid.nih.gov/research/tmrc-program-overview
[https://perma.cc/Q49Y-7W7L] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
229. Id.
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both support useful research in these areas of unmet need and “build capacity
to enable [the Centers] to conduct future clinical trials, implement new
treatment and prevention strategies, and develop novel vector control
strategies.”230 In other words, the NIH aims to use grant funding to establish
the capacity for future useful work even after initial funding has ended.231 The
Institute funds training to build research capacity, focusing on institutions in
developing nations.232
Grants are unlikely to fully solve any of these problems of inadequate
demand. But they provide useful innovation tools. Outterson and Aaron
Kesselheim recognize that grants can play a role, within a complex system of
tailored incentives, in supporting underlying research to reduce the cost of
developing new antibiotics.233 In a pleasant example of putting theory into
practice, Outterson—in the years since he helped bring antibiotic resistance
incentive problems to greater salience—has become the Executive Director of
a $350-million grant-funded project aimed at increasing innovation in
antibiotic development, including efforts that are too risky or paradigmchallenging for private development, as well as relatively mainstream efforts
that suffer from the incentive problems described above.234
This type of grant-funding raises important questions: Who identifies
underfunded innovations whose social value exceeds market value, and how?
These questions may be especially challenging for applied research that does
not obviously promote the same sorts of knowledge spillovers as basic
research. Here, the first critique of grants—bureaucrats make funding
decisions—has more bite.235 But that may be precisely the point. This type of
social welfare problem—social value that exceeds market price signals—is
exactly the type of problem that market actors with private knowledge are ill
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Funding Opportunity Announcement PAR-17-057: Global Infectious Disease Research
Training Program (D43), NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PAR-17-057.html
https://perma.cc/27K8-J49U] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
233. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Fighting Antibiotic Resistance: Marrying New
Financial Incentives to Meeting Public Health Goals, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1689, 1694 (2010). Kesselheim
and Outterson also respond to the risk allocation concern described supra, suggesting that
“[f]or drugs that ultimately emerge from public investment programs, the government should
receive an appropriate share of the enhanced reimbursement by payers.” Id.
234. See Kevin Outterson et al., Accelerating Global Innovation to Address Antibacterial
Resistance: Introducing CARB-X, 15 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 589 (2016).
235. See supra Section II.B.1; cf. Abramowicz, supra note 50, at 1366–67 (arguing that
orphan drug development should be subsidized only when they are inefficient and that
government officials are likely unable to make that determination).
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suited to fix.236 The specialized knowledge of scientist peer reviewers might
have more traction, but really, this is a problem about social welfare and
identifying substantial unmet needs on a broader level. While the government
(or philanthropic organizations) might do this inefficiently, it can make that
social choice in a way that private firms won’t.237
Even accepting that the government might be the right entity to make this
sort of resource allocation call, how should it go about the task? Sachs argues
that this sort of centralized decision-making is an opportunity for interagency
collaboration to leverage different sources of knowledge and expertise.238 With
respect to under-addressed diseases, she notes that the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) possess extensive information useful for NIH
decisions on funding allocation, including on disease burdens; existing drugs;
and, in combination, which diseases are currently underserved.239
Unfortunately, such interagency collaboration is relatively underdeveloped,240
but the collective expertise of CMS, the Centers for Disease Control, and other
relevant agencies could help direct the funding allocation decisions of the NIH
to address unmet biomedical needs with substantial potential social welfare
gains.
2. Appropriability Failures
Grants can also pick up the incentive slack where markets value an
innovation adequately, but firms cannot appropriate enough of its value to
justify investment. The problem of appropriating the value of an information
good is a fundamental justification for intellectual property. Ideally, intellectual
property allows firms to appropriate social value of nonexclusive, nonrivalrous
information goods by creating an exclusivity mechanism.241 But intellectual

236. In some cases, of course, no entity, whether private or public, will have a good answer
as to the social value of a potential innovation. In such cases, whoever is making the decision
must simply muddle through—as happens anyway. See, e.g., Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of
“Muddling Through”, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959) (explaining the difficulty in determining
the social value of a policy).
237. Cf. Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 439–41 (proposing that the grant system issue
calls for scientists to propose important cross-disciplinary problems that need to be solved).
238. Rachel E. Sachs, Administering Health Innovation, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1991, 1993–96
(2018).
239. Id. at 2028.
240. See id. at 2038–41; see generally Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary
Collaboration: The Oncofertility Consortium as an Emerging Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING
MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 259 (Kathy Strandburg, Brett Frischmann, & Michael
Madison eds., 2017) (discussing failures in interagency collaboration in the context of the NIH
Roadmap grants) [hereinafter Pedraza-Fariña, Oncofertility].
241. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (discussing the different justifications that exist for having
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property mechanisms don’t always work. Where they fail, grants can step in,
even if the innovation is relatively late in the development pipeline.242
To take one prominent example, medical diagnostics are a tough target for
current patent law; grants could help. Diagnostics range from simple blood
tests used in everyday care to the use of next-generation sequencing and
complex multigene panels to pinpoint the cause of cancer. Often, the science
underlying a diagnostic test is developed with grant funding. For instance, the
Supreme Court’s 2012 case about diagnostic methods patents, Mayo v.
Prometheus, turned on a relationship between the proper dosing of a drug and
the amount of a drug-related metabolite in the patient’s blood.243 That
relationship was identified through grant-funded research, though the Court
did not note that.244 When the Court held in Mayo that the resulting diagnostic
test was unpatentable as essentially stating a natural law (the underlying
relationship) and telling doctors to “apply it,”245 scholars (including me) noted
that this description could cover many diagnostic tests, and worried that
patents would no longer provide adequate incentives for firms to develop
diagnostic tests and bring them into the market and into clinical use.246 Some
have suggested changing patent law to allay this concern.247 But grants may do
the job without needing to change patent law.248
Grants could support the process of bringing scientific relationships into
use as diagnostic tests. For some diagnostics, not much needs to be done to
go from relationship to test: once scientists identify genetic mutations
associated with a disease (often using grant money), doctors can then identify

exclusive intellectual property).
242. See Ouellette, supra note 22, at 1131–32, 1134–35, 1139.
243. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73–75 (2012)
(describing diagnostic technology in question).
244. See Marla C. Dubinsky et al., Pharmacogenomics and Metabolite Measurement for 6Mercaptopurine Therapy in Inflammatory Bowel Disease, 118 GASTROENTEROLOGY 705, 713 (2000)
(“Supported by the Charles Bruneau Foundation . . . Fonds de la Recherche en Santé du
Québec . . . and Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et l’Aide à la Recherche . . . .”).
245. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73.
246. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 21; Sachs, supra note 21; W. Nicholson Price II, Big
Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1425–26 (2016).
247. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Peter S. Menell & David O. Taylor, Final Report of the
Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges,
33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551 (2018) (outlining a workshop aimed at changing aspects of patent
law).
248. Changing patent law back to a pre-Mayo state would bring its own complications. See,
e.g., Price, supra note 246, at 1444–45 (briefly discussing these problems and citing more indepth analyses). At a minimum, the Supreme Court seems uninterested in this possibility,
having reaffirmed Mayo in Alice; change would require Congressional action.
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the mutation after obtaining the patient’s genetic sequence.249 In those cases,
additional grants may not even be needed. If more research needs to be
done—exploring how well existing assays measure the relationship, whether
the relationship accurately predicts status in various groups, and whether
measurements can be used to improve clinical outcomes—grants can support
this work without relying on patent incentives. And where doctors need new
technology to apply newly discovered scientific relationships, patent law can
still provide the market-calibrated incentives it does for other biomedical
technologies—but focused on the technology, not the underlying relationship.
For diagnostics, then, grants can support intermediate-cost technologies where
some incentive is needed but other incentives are unavailable.
***
Grants are not unique in their ability to create incentives for innovation
where social value exceeds appropriable market value. Prizes, in particular, can
also provide incentives for such innovation, because they typically do not rely
on exclusivity or matching market demand.250 Indeed, prizes may work better
in some circumstances where parallel effort between many research teams is
demanded,251 though they do not particularly help capital constrained firms.252
R&D tax credits also create incentives for innovation where social value
exceeds appropriable market value, though they do so by reducing innovation
costs across the board rather than by targeting particular areas of likely social
benefit. The point is not that grants are the only mechanism that can create
incentives to solve this type of innovation problem, but that grants are a useful
tool in this area, and that they use a different set of decision processes to create
incentives. Grants are unique, however, in a different area.

249. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing role of DNA testing in diagnostics). In a parallel to Mayo, the
Supreme Court held in Myriad that unaltered genomic DNA is unpatentable, making simple
genetic tests of the “here’s an important mutation; find it to diagnose a problem” variety
similarly unpatentable. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 580 (2013) (holding that “a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and
not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated”). Today, doctors don’t typically
interpret genetic results on their own—genetic counselors act as intermediaries to interpret
genetic testing results. A business model could rely on providing that intermediary service. Cf.
Rachel E. Sachs, Divided Infringement and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, IP THEORY (forthcoming)
(noting the difficulty of enforcing diagnostic methods patents in models with such
intermediaries). But there is nothing to stop information about well-characterized mutations
from becoming as routinely interpreted as, for instance, high cholesterol levels, once genetic
sequencing becomes more common.
250. See Adler, supra note 16, at 12–13.
251. Id. at 13–14.
252. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 336.
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INNOVATION ENABLERS

Grants can support the people, institutions, processes, and infrastructure
that enable innovation and shape its direction. Let me unpack that through a
comparison with other innovation incentives. Patents focus on particular
inventions: a patent protects the invention itself from appropriation by
someone other than the patentee. Similarly, prizes address a particular product
or outcome, like creating an accurate clock, finding a way to preserve food for
a long period of time, creating a reusable vehicle for space flight, or the like.253
Trade secrecy protects information, whether that be a way of manufacturing a
challenging drug or a carefully assembled list of potential customers.254 Each
of these creates an incentive to develop the thing, the product, the output—
and the rest of the innovation process is shaped around that incentive. Grants
are different. They can focus on particular projects; indeed, many do. But grants
can also fund individuals directly, allowing that individual to innovate in
whatever way she sees best, whether that be toward a commercially viable
product, basic knowledge production, or a set of several linked possibilities.
Grants can aim squarely to build institutions, supporting centers or networks
that can then pursue their own institutional research and innovation goals.
They can shape innovation processes and build resources that enable fields to
move forward. In this flexibility of focus, grants diverge sharply from patents,
trade secrets, and prizes.255 This Section describes four potential grant targets
besides projects themselves: people, institutions, processes, and infrastructural
datasets.

253. See, e.g., LONGITUDE PRIZE, https://longitudeprize.org/ [https://perma.cc/HL7CYKN7] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (detailing the Longitude Prize, originally for ship navigation
but currently for overcoming antibiotic resistance); Stephen Schaber, Why Napoleon Offered a
Prize for Inventing Canned Food, NPR (Mar. 1, 2012) https://www.npr.org/sections/
money/2012/03/01/147751097/why-napoleon-offered-a-prize-for-inventing-canned-food
[https://perma.cc/LTE5-H9X4] (describing Napoleon’s 1795 prize for improvement of food
preservation methods); Tina Rosenberg, Prizes with an Eye Toward the Future, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
29, 2012), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/prizes-with-an-eye-towardthe-future/ [https://perma.cc/S8LZ-JY32] (noting the X Prize for private spaceflight); see
generally Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Innovation Prizes in Practice and Theory, 29 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 401, 402–06 (2016) (describing the use of innovation prizes in general, including
Longitude Prize and X Prize).
254. See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1044–45 (2016) (explaining trade secrecy in relation to
biologics manufacturing); see also Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1805–06 (2014) (describing trade secret doctrine).
255. Inasmuch as tax incentives create fungible incentives for any type of research
undertaken by an entity which would otherwise owe income taxes, they function as an entitytargeted incentive rather than an outcome-focused incentive. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra
note 2, at 321–26.
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1. People
Two types of people might merit particular focus in terms of funding
innovation: the exceptional and the young. Orthogonally, grants can support
individuals either directly, without regard to project, or by weighing individual
characteristics in addition to project merit.
a) The Exceptional and the Young
Why focus on exceptional individuals and the young? For the first, we
might find it worthwhile to target truly exceptional individuals for grant
support. That is, if we can identify the best scientists, we might judge them
particularly good targets for grant funding because we think their projects are
likely to be particularly influential.256 We might also think them likely to
produce, on average, more good ideas than other researchers; helping them
pursue those projects rather than struggle for funding would increase social
benefits.257
Separately, we might benefit from targeting younger scientists for grant
support. Freeman and Van Reenen point to three reasons that younger
scientists should be particular targets of grant funding: (1) in many fields,
especially highly technical fields, researchers do their best work when they are
relatively young, (2) providing funding early in a young scientist’s career
increases the odds that she will continue to pursue science, and (3) funding for
scientists is among other things an investment in human capital.258 All things
being equal, a younger scientist has more time left in her career to use that
capital (and to produce social benefits from that investment) than an older
scientist.259 Grant support is crucial to the careers of young scientists; as
McGarity describes it, “[y]ounger scientists at prestigious institutions have no
hope of becoming tenured if they do not have at least one NIH or NSF
grant.”260

256. See Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 209, at 17–18 (describing the need to identify
the most creative individuals), 22–23 (arguing that researchers with the most fertile minds will
self-select into the grant system).
257. Id. at 23–24.
258. For empirical evidence that human capital investments are more important to
innovation than physical capital investments, see Fabian Waldinger, Bombs, Brains, and Science:
The Role of Human and Physical Capital for the Creation of Scientific Knowledge, 98 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 811, 811 (2016).
259. Freeman & Van Reenen, supra note 91, at 22–23.
260. McGarity, supra note 91, at 65 (“Denying a grant to a more established researcher
can close his or her laboratory and effectively end his or her career as a productive
researcher.”); see Freeman & Van Reenan, supra note 91, at 19. Of course, grants are also
important to later researchers.
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Unfortunately, the current reality is that younger scientists have a hard time
getting grant funding. The average age at which a PhD scientist gets her first
R01 grant has been around 42 for several years; in 1980 it was 36.8.261 Freeman
and Van Reenen calculate that younger scientists have approximately tenfold
worse chances of winning an R01 grant than scientists over 45.262 This fact has
worried scientists and policymakers, leading to policy changes including the
mechanisms described in the next Section.263
b) Person-Focusing and Project-Weighting
A preference for a particular type of individual in grant funding can be
implemented in at least two ways. First, grants can fund an individual separate
from any project, to enable her to innovate, or to train her and therefore
increase her human capital. Second, grant funding decisions can still focus on
projects, but can heavily weight particular researcher characteristics.
Table 1: Examples of Grants Targeting People

Person-focused
Training
Exceptional

n/a

Enabling
HHMI,
MacArthur

Young

F31, F32

n/a

Project preference
Implicit advantage
ESI rules

Some individual-targeted grants focus entirely on enabling innovation by
the individual. Training grants are common and aim to increase the expertise
and human capital of the funded individual. The NIH offers several types of
training grants, such as the F31 grant for supervised research training of
doctoral candidates, the F32 grant for postdoctoral fellows “to broaden their
scientific background and extend their potential for research,” and the F33
Senior Fellow grant to help “experienced scientists to make major changes in
the direction of research careers, or to acquire new research capabilities.”264
These grants are “training awards and not research awards.”265 They do not

261. See Average Age and Degree of NIH R01-Equivalent First-Time Awardees Fiscal Years 19802016, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/new_investigators/Average_age_initial_R01.xls
[https://perma.cc/63JU-9FNY] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
262. Freeman & Van Reenen, supra note 91, at 21.
263. See, e.g., Ronald J. Daniels, A Generation at Risk: Young Investigators and the Future of the
Biomedical Workforce, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 313 (2015) (describing the effects of
declining research grants to young researchers to the biomedical industry).
264. Individual Fellowships, NIH, https://researchtraining.nih.gov/programs/fellowships
[https://perma.cc/GS28-HBB4] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
265. NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 70, at IIB-37.
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focus on the project, but rather the candidate’s potential and need for training
as well as how the proposed training, sponsor, and environment will address
that need.266 The K series grants similarly serve career development goals.267
This group of grants focuses entirely on individuals and on enabling future
innovation by building human capital.268
A different type of individual-enabling grant simply provides resources and
an open mandate to an exceptional individual. The reasoning is that
exceptional individuals, given freedom and resources, will tackle hard, risky
problems and may produce exceptional results.269 The NIH doesn’t focus on
this type of award, but other funders sometimes do. The Howard Hughes
Medical Institute is perhaps the most substantial such funder and the
MacArthur Foundation the closest follower of an individual-focused model.
Howard Hughes, with the motto “People, Not Projects,” identifies
outstanding biomedical innovators, selects them as Howard Hughes Medical
Investigators (currently there are around 300), and provides them with
substantial funding—around $1 million per year—for renewable seven-year
terms.270 Howard Hughes aims to give “our scientists the time and freedom to
pursue difficult, long-range questions,”271 and at least some evidence suggests
that this strategy works.272 The MacArthur Foundation provides even purer
grant funding to exceptional individuals, commonly known as Genius Grants.

266. Id.
267. Id. at IIB-80 (e.g., K01 grants for advanced research training and additional
experience).
268. Id.
269. Patents can also highly reward the exceptional scientist, of course, but that depends
on the research creating appropriable rewards; prizes depend on post-hoc recognition and
typically do not provide funds to support research going forward.
270. See Fast Facts, HOWARD HUGHES MED. INST., https://www.hhmi.org/pressroom/fast-facts [https://perma.cc/A3WS-F2EZ] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (noting 292
current HHMI investigators); HHMI Bets Big on 19 New Investigators, HOWARD HUGHES MED.
INST.,
https://www.hhmi.org/news/hhmi-bets-big-on-19-new-investigators
[https://perma.cc/TAU3-UQ58] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (noting approximately $8 million
in grants over a seven-year term for each Investigator). Technically, the researchers become
HHMI employees, suggesting something more like a patronage model than classical grant
funding. See Our Scientists, HOWARD HUGHES MED. INST., http://www.hhmi.org/scientists
[https://perma.cc/DSS8-9J7C] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). But they remain at their home
institutions and retain their home appointments, and receive substantial funding to continue
research in that context, making the appointment look very much like a person-focused grant.
Id.
271. Biomedical Research Programs, HOWARD HUGHES MED. INST., http://www.hhmi.org/
programs/biomedical-research [https://perma.cc/5E8M-7Y9H] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
272. See Azoulay, Zivin & Manso, supra note 202, at 528–29 (noting substantial differences
in funding mechanisms and finding that Howard Hughes Medical Investigators produced
more high-impact publications than NIH-funded scientists with similar accomplishments).
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It provides “$625,000, no-strings-attached” five-year grants based on
“[e]xceptional creativity” and the potential for substantial future work.273 The
Foundation “does not require or expect specific products or reports” from
recipients.274
A different approach prioritizes projects by taking into account the
characteristics of the individual researchers. The clearest example of this
explicit prioritization comes in the NIH’s special rules for grant applications
by New and Early Stage Investigators—respectively, those who have not yet
won a major research award and those within ten years of finishing their
terminal degree.275 For several years, the NIH has tried to reduce the age at
which young scientists win their first major grants. The NIH clusters grant
applications from New Investigators in peer review, so it can compare
researchers with similar experience.276 At least half of researchers receiving
their first R01 or equivalent grant must be within ten years of finishing their
terminal degree.277 Finally, NIH Institutes make funding decisions aimed to
achieve similar success rates for new grant applications by New Investigators
and established investigators.278 For instance, the National Cancer Institute’s
2016 funding policy funded grants to the 10th percentile for established
investigators but the 12th percentile for Early Stage Investigators—effectively
putting a thumb on the scale for young researchers.279 These policies generally
reflect the goal of providing funding to younger scientists to invest in their
futures—a goal that grants are uniquely suited to advance.280

273. About
MacArthur
Fellows
Program,
MACARTHUR
FOUND.,
https://www.macfound.org/programs/fellows/strategy/ [https://perma.cc/6L9N-L5BF]
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
274. Id.
275. Early Stage Investigator Policies, NIH, https://grants.nih.gov/policy/new_
investigators/index.htm [https://perma.cc/3HFY-DTL7] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). For
researchers who are medical doctors, Early Stage Investigators are those within ten years of
finishing their medical residency. See id. To the best of my knowledge, no similar program
exists for exceptional individuals—but exceptional researchers would be expected to submit
exceptional grant applications in any case, and so should have an implicit advantage anyway.
276. See id.
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. NCI, 2016 Funding Strategy, supra note 146. The NIH Director also has a set of grants
to support extraordinary individuals, some of which, like the DP1 NIH Director’s Pioneer
Award, are specifically targeted at exceptional young researchers Grants. See Types of Grant
Programs,
NIH,
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/funding_program.htm
[https://perma.cc/TZ3T-BDWV] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) [hereinafter NIH, Activity Codes]
(providing overview of NIH Activity Codes).
280. Some prizes are explicitly targeted at the young, such as the Fields medal or the John
Bates Clark medal, rewarded to outstanding mathematicians and economists, respectively,
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1. Institutions
Grants can also target broader innovative entities, providing funding to
institutions to enable future innovation. NIH grants typically fund research
within a laboratory environment, whether in an academic institution, a
hospital, or private industry. And indeed, NIH support for labs is critical;
grants provide support for equipment, salaries, and research supplies, and are
especially important in capital-constrained environments.281 This ability of
grants to purchase the equipment necessary for research has even been raised
as a justification for the historical move from a prize-based to a grant-based
innovation system.282 More broadly, grants can enable the creation of new
institutions, support the efforts of existing institutions, or allow existing
institutions to increase their capacity. Similar to the focus on exceptional
individuals described above, the NIH can identify institutions that are likely to
be especially productive and help them increase their capabilities.
The NIH provides many grants specifically targeted at increasing
institutional capabilities. The G11 grant helps institutions improve their
research infrastructure by providing funds for them to establish an office of
sponsored research to work with grant funders.283 M01 grants support
“General Clinical Research Center[s] where scientists conduct studies on a
wide range of human diseases using the full spectrum of the biomedical
science,” and can fund renovation, staff salaries, equipment, and supplies.284
P01 grants support research programs, P30 grants support administrative cores
for centers, P51 grants support primate research colonies, and P60 grants
support comprehensive centers—the list goes on.285 Suffice it to say, the NIH
can and does target institutions, centers, and programs of different sizes and
foci, all to further the goal of enabling innovation by those best suited to
innovate. As with focusing on individuals, this institution-supporting role is
essentially unique to grants.

under the age of forty. Fields Medal, INT’L MATHEMATICAL UNION, https://www.math
union.org/imu-awards/fields-medal [https://perma.cc/4VSW-EWA4] (last visited Mar. 11,
2019); John Bates Clark Medal, AM. ECON. ASS’N, https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/honorsawards/bates-clark [https://perma.cc/5LG3-DQU4] (last visited July 2, 2017). However,
such prizes generally do not provide substantial funds for either training or research going
forward.
281. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 2, at 334–38.
282. See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 52, at 7–8.
283. See NIH, Activity Codes, supra note 279 (G11 grant description available from
dropdown list).
284. Id. (M11 grant description available from dropdown list).
285. Id.
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2. Processes
Grants can influence the processes through which innovation takes place;
in particular, they can create incentives for collaboration and interdisciplinary
work. Again, this focus differs from other incentives; patents, prizes, and tax
R&D incentives tend not to take account of innovation environment.
Collaboration may impact the value of these rewards—joint inventorship
changes the control mechanisms for patents, and of course joint creation splits
the reward of any of these mechanisms—but other policy levers do not
specifically encourage collaboration.286 Grants, by contrast, can and do.
Grants can generally target collaborative work where researchers from
different labs or institutions work together on a funded project.
Encouragement can be explicit, such as requirements that recipients participate
in collaborative research networks.287 Elias Zerhouni, the Director of the NIH,
launched the 2002 Roadmap for Medical Research Initiative specifically to
encourage and fund collaborative team science.288 Grants may also implicitly
encourage collaboration by preferentially funding projects that require
collaborative work.289
An important subset of process-focused grants promotes interdisciplinary
work. Boundary-crossing work can push forward the frontiers of science and
innovation.290 However, interdisciplinary work is hard; it is challenging to
master multiple disciplines or to reach across disciplinary lines, and
interdisciplinary researchers may encounter resistance from peers and
scientific institutions.291 Such work is also “high-risk, high-reward,” suggesting

286. See Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the
Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2001 (2011) (“Problematically, the laws
of joint authorship and joint inventorship in intellectual property actually dissuade certain
collaboration.”).
287. Interview with Anonymous Senior Scientist (June 7, 2017) (on file with author)
(describing grant requirement that recipients participate in a research network and noting that
it led to productive collaborative work).
288. See generally Elias A. Zerhouni, The NIH Roadmap, 302 SCIENCE 63 (2003).
289. See Robin Barr, R01 Teams and Grantee Age Trends in Grant Funding, NIH NAT’L INST.
ON AGING (April 22, 2015), https://www.nia.nih.gov/research/blog/2015/04/r01-teamsand-grantee-age-trends-grant-funding [https://perma.cc/F7JB-6EWL] (noting that the modal
top-scoring R01 grant in 2005 had one principal investigator; in 2015 it had four).
290. See JULIE THOMPSON KLEIN, INTERDISCIPLINARITY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND
PRACTICE 12 (1990); Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 439–41; see also Michal Shur-Ofry,
Connect the Dots: Patents and Interdisciplinarity, 51 MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 62–65 (2017).
291. See Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 423–24 (discussing social barriers to
interdisciplinary innovation). There is a rich literature outside law on interdisciplinarity. See,
e.g., Susan Leigh Star & James R. Griesemer, Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary
Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39, 19 SOCIAL
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that innovation incentives are likely to be useful in promoting investment.
Unfortunately, patents aren’t especially good at promoting interdisciplinary
work; Michal Shur-Ofry writes that patent law generally regards
interdisciplinary combinations “not as a potential source of groundbreaking
innovation, but at most, as an excusable flaw.”292
Grants, on the other hand, can directly target and facilitate interdisciplinary
work.293 Laura Pedraza-Fariña examines an NIH grant program that aimed
squarely at interdisciplinary work.294 She focuses on one part of Zerhouni’s
Roadmap, the Interdisciplinary Research Consortia grants, which funded nine
interdisciplinary consortia between 2005 and 2012.295 Pedraza-Fariña recounts
the formation of the Oncofertility Consortium, a network of researchers
focused on solving the problem of oncofertility—that is, how can we ensure
that cancer patients can still have children after their treatment?296 Oncofertility
is a knotty scientific problem, and a tough interdisciplinary one: oncologists,
reproductive endocrinologists, and basic research scientists have substantially
different approaches and areas of expertise.297 Pedraza-Fariña describes how
the grant program, which specifically called for interdisciplinary applications,
served as a “catalyst to collaboration—providing short-term, seed funding to
enable cross-disciplinary collaboration.”298 It did so by combining several
different grant types, including some types described above: a U54

STUD. SCI 387 (1989) (coining the term “boundary object”); TRADING ZONES AND
INTERACTIONAL EXPERTISE: CREATING NEW KINDS OF COLLABORATION (Michael E.
Gorman ed., 2010) (discussing framework for fostering interdisciplinary collaborations).
292. Shur-Ofry, supra note 290, at 72; see Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 436–38 (arguing
that patent doctrine is actively hostile to interdisciplinary innovation and suggesting
modifications); Mandel, supra note 286; Jacob S. Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 2011 BYU L.
REV. 1091, 1094–95 (2011) (noting that interdisciplinary combinations are less susceptible to
“analogous arts,” and have the effect of “negativing” inventions).
293. See Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 442 (“[G]overnment grants or prizes can be
structured to incentivize the identification of problems whose solution requires the combined
expertise from multiple disciplines and subdisciplines.”). Note that collaboration and
interdisciplinarity are not targets only of NIH grants, nor indeed only of federal grants; they
can be targeted by any grant funder. See, e.g., MCubed, UNIV. MICH., supra note 83 (noting that
funding will be provided only to teams of at least three faculty researchers from at least two
different campus units).
294. See generally Pedraza-Fariña, Oncofertility, supra note 240.
295. Id. at 260 (citing Interdisciplinary Program Snapshot, NIH, https://common
fund.nih.gov/Interdisciplinary [https://perma.cc/8U8V-JJ28]). Because obtaining crossdisciplinary grants from individual disease-focused NIH Institutes is hard, the broader
Interdisciplinary Research program was funded by the Common Fund, a central pool of
money used for larger strategic NIH initiatives. Id.
296. Id. at 260.
297. Id. at 260–61.
298. Id. at 261.
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Cooperative Agreement for a specialized center to support a centralized
administrative core to organize and coordinate the team,299 four R01 Research
Project grants to support basic research into female follicles,300 two P30 Center
Core grants to fund a core for maintaining and distributing patient samples
and other materials and to fund the National Physician’s Cooperative (the
network of participants), an R25 Education Project grant to fund an
“educational module,” and three different grants (a T90 Interdisciplinary
Research Training Award, an R90 Interdisciplinary Regular Research Training
Award, and a K01 Research Scientist Development Award - Research &
Training) to fund training for oncofertility specialists.301 The Interdisciplinary
Research Consortia program leveraged several different grant regimes with the
goal of not only supporting interdisciplinary collaboration, but also of
catalyzing something that would last long-term. In short, the grant program
tried to use a jolt of focused funding to create something novel and sustainable.
And it worked. As Pedraza-Fariña documents, the Oncofertility
Consortium developed specifically in response to the Interdisciplinary
Research Consortia program’s call for applications. Although the scientists
involved knew each other, “none of them . . . had embarked on a collaboration
of this magnitude, nor held a focused discussion on how to address fertility
preservation questions in a concerted manner prior to applying for the
oncofertility consortium grant.”302 Although the Interdisciplinary Research
Consortia program ended in 2012, the Oncofertility Consortium continues
today.303 In addition, the Consortium has built infrastructure that can be used
going forward and has spawned other ongoing collaborations.304
The Oncofertility Consortium was not the only interdisciplinary
consortium funded by the NIH’s program. The program also funded consortia
focused on the molecular mechanisms of stress; the science of aging with a
focus on cancer, organ design and engineering; and obesity and metabolic
disorders, among others.305 At least some are still active today.306 And as

299. Id. at 280.
300. Id. at 262 n.20.
301. Id. at 280.
302. Id. at 275.
303. THE ONCOFERTILITY CONSORTIUM, http://oncofertility.northwestern.edu/
[https://perma.cc/B493-SUKY] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
304. Pedraza-Fariña, Oncofertility, supra note 240, at 283.
305. See Interdisciplinary Research Consortia, NIH, https://commonfund.nih.gov/
Interdisciplinary/consortia [https://perma.cc/FM58-MWH3] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
306. In comparison with the still-vital Oncofertility Consortium, see, for example,
Taskforce for Obesity Research at UT Southwestern (TORS), U.T. SOUTHWESTERN,
https://www.utsouthwestern.edu/education/medical-school/departments/center-human
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Pedraza-Fariña points out, overcoming initial hurdles to collaboration may be
much of the battle; even if particular consortia end, the possibility of
interdisciplinary collaboration remains easier after the initial structural work
has been done—work that grants can specifically target and support.307
3. Infrastructure
Finally, grants can specifically target infrastructural goods to create broad
support for future innovation. Brett Frischmann characterizes infrastructural
goods by three key traits: (1) they “may be consumed nonrivalrously for some
appreciable range of demand”; (2) they are valuable largely because they are
inputs into downstream productive activities; and (3) such activities may
produce a wide range of goods, including public goods, social goods, and
private goods.308 Infrastructural goods are socially valuable because they enable
a broad range of activities and have many spillovers; they are public goods and
enable others to generate public goods.309 But that’s why the incentives to
invest in infrastructural goods tend to be too low. On the supply side, it is hard
for infrastructure investors to appropriate the full social benefits of their
investment: infrastructure has spillover benefits that are hard to capture.310
And on the demand side, even if infrastructure investors could appropriate all
the private demand for the infrastructural good, users are unlikely to be willing
to pay the full social value for access to the infrastructure, because they may be
creating public goods whose benefits they cannot appropriate.311 All of which
is to say: infrastructural goods have substantial social benefits, but it is rare for
private entities to have the right incentives to either create the infrastructure
in the first place or allow broad enough, cheap enough use that downstream
users create the largest social value.312
Enter grants. The government can get involved to help overcome the
challenges with private incentives for infrastructure.313 Sometimes that is direct
construction; for example, the federal government built and runs the interstate
highway system.314 Sometimes not; grants can provide a powerful way to

nutrition/obesity-alliance.html [https://perma.cc/LF23-VR2X] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019)
(showing no publications after 2012 and no conference meetings after 2014).
307. Pedraza-Fariña, Oncofertility, supra note 240, at 283–84.
308. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES 61–62 (2013).
309. Id. at 68–69.
310. Id. at 14–15.
311. Id. at 71–72.
312. See id. at 98.
313. Id. at 14–15.
314. Id. at 189–90.
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leverage non-governmental expertise in large, infrastructural projects designed
to create resources that will broadly enable future scientific endeavors.315 These
projects tend to be motivated by the centralized belief—held by both
administrators and scientists—that the infrastructure project will create
substantial social value. Prominent NIH programs have thus used grants to
drive large-scale scientific infrastructure projects and to make their fruits
broadly available.316
The Human Genome Project, which started at the end of the 20th century,
is a key example.317 The Project was a massive undertaking that aimed to
sequence the entire human genome.318 The explicit goal of the project was to
create infrastructure for future research, “to provide researchers with powerful
tools to understand the genetic factors in human disease, paving the way for
new strategies for their diagnosis, treatment and prevention.”319 Liscow and
Karpilow highlight the potential for government spending to shift the course
of future innovation: where legacy technologies (in their example, highpollution fossil fuel technology) benefit from a large existing stock of
knowledge, concentrated government efforts to support knowledge
generation in a new technology can shift future innovation in a socially
desirable direction.320
The Human Genome Project followed this pattern, creating benefits
beside the genome map itself. The production of a human genome sequence
enabled a large set of downstream uses, including developments in
pharmacogenomics and genetic testing.321 It helped shift innovation away from

315. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Leviathan in the Commons: Biomedical Data and the State,
in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 19 (Kathy J. Strandburg, Brett M.
Frischmann & Michael J. Madison eds., 2017) (describing the ways government actors shape
biomedical data resources beyond merely supporting their creation).
316. See Jorge L. Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy: Policy, Patents, and the Design of the Genome
Commons, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61 (2011) (describing the evolution of data release
policies for genomic data starting with the 1996 Bermuda Principles); Jorge L. Contreras,
Constructing the Genome Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 99, 102 (Brett M.
Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Kathy J. Strandburg eds., 2014) (describing genomic data
as a commons with a “unique polycentric governance institution”).
317. See HILGARTNER, supra note 174 (describing the history of the Genome Project,
focusing on the creation and change of knowledge-control regimes).
318. Of course, there is no one human genome; almost everyone’s is different. The Project
aimed to generate a generalized consensus sequence upon which variations could be mapped.
319. NIH, FACT SHEET: HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 1 (Oct. 2010),
https://report.nih.gov/NIHfactsheets/Pdfs/HumanGenomeProject(NHGRI).pdf
[https://perma.cc/NY3D-2XEQ] [hereinafter NIH, FACT SHEET].
320. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 51, at 392–93.
321. See NIH, FACT SHEET, supra note 319 (noting thousands of disease genes discovered,
thousands of new genetic tests, hundreds of biotechnology products in clinical trials, and
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the use of inexact or problematic proxies, like using race as a proxy for
unmeasured genetic traits, and toward more direct genetic diagnostics.322 The
Human Genome Project also created a guaranteed demand for technological
advances that otherwise might be too risky, including novel genetic sequencing
technology.323 The project explicitly sought to develop technology and
information infrastructure, eventually leading to lower costs despite the initial
outlay.324
A private effort to sequence the human genome, Celera Genomics,
illustrates the role of the government in such infrastructure projects. Celera
Genomics entered the fray several years after the Human Genome Project
began, aiming to complete its sequence much faster than the publicly funded
effort.325 But Celera Genomics’ own effort—while impressive, fast, and
generating and leveraging its own technological advances—itself relied
substantially on publicly funded sequence data infrastructure resources.326
According to Steven Hilgartner’s history of the Human Genome Project,
approximately 60% of the completed sequence shared in Celera’s Science
paper was in fact downloaded from the Human Genome Project’s publicly
available dataset.327 The differences between the two projects also illuminate
the benefits of publicly funded, relatively open management of infrastructural
resources.328 The publicly funded effort helped develop the technology that
supported the private effort—which then developed its own tremendously
useful technology and created an important comparator sequence.329 But even
once both sequences existed, Celera’s management of its own sequence as a
private resource with paid access limited the sequence’s uses to those with the
resources to pay, and, likely, to a subset of uses with more potential for
immediate commercial gain rather than basic research or other projects with

ongoing enabled scientific research).
322. See W. Nicholson Price II, Note, Patenting Race: The Problems of Ethnic Genetic Testing
Patents, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 119, 134–37 (2007).
323. Cf. Glennerster, Kremer & Williams, supra note 57, passim (describing advance
purchase commitments as a mechanism to create incentives for firms to develop vaccines that
otherwise might be too risky to draw enough investment).
324. See HILGARTNER, supra note 174, at 50.
325. Id. at 206–10.
326. Id. at 221.
327. Id.
328. See supra notes 308–313 and accompanying text.
329. See Int’l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the
Human Genome, 409 NATURE 860 (2001) (announcing the Human Genome Project’s
completed sequence); see also J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291
SCIENCE 1304 (2001) (announcing Celera’s completed sequence).
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greater spillovers.330
Today, grants can help develop precision medicine and complex
algorithms based on medical big data. The Precision Medicine Initiative aims
to advance our knowledge of precision medicine, providing “the right
treatments to the right patients at the right time.”331 It does this by supporting
basic scientific research along these lines and also by partnering with many
institutions to gather extensive genetic and health information, as well as
biospecimens, on over one million volunteers—the “All of Us” cohort—as an
infrastructural resource for future innovation.332 As Sachs notes, such large
infrastructural initiatives can also focus other stakeholder efforts; the Precision
Medicine Initiative has stimulated non-governmental investors to commit over
$200 million.333
A step further in the future, complex medical algorithms have the potential
for tremendous benefits to the health care system, including improving patient
care, optimizing resource allocation, suggesting new possibilities for treatment,
and identifying problems or unknown benefits of existing drugs.334 But current
innovation incentives are problematic. Patents are often unavailable, and
relying on secrecy for databases or algorithms creates an array of problems.335
In addition, market signals of demand may substantially underrepresent social
value, particularly for the collection and use of data for underserved
populations, including poor and minority populations.336 NIH grants could
support the development of infrastructure, focusing on assembling and
curating data, especially for underserved populations, and making it broadly

330. HILGARTNER, supra note 174, at 212–13.
331. See Precision Medicine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
medicaldevices/productsandmedicalprocedures/invitrodiagnostics/precisionmedicinemedicaldevices/default.htm [https://perma.cc/9ZMZ-GK2E] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
332. Scientific Opportunities, NIH, https://allofus.nih.gov/about/scientific-opportunities
[https://perma.cc/H7EX-6V6A] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (“The program will set the
foundation for new ways of engaging research participants, sharing health data and
information, and employing technology advances to mine the information for comprehensive
results.”); see Awardees, NIH, https://allofus.nih.gov/funding/awardees [https://perma.cc/
PA8E-TZNW] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (noting award of a U24 Cooperative Agreement to
the Mayo Clinic to host a specimen biobank).
333. Sachs, supra note 238, at 2002 (citing Press Release, White House, FACT SHEET:
Obama Administration Announces Key Actions to Accelerate Precision Medicine Initiative
(Feb. 25, 2016)).
334. W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 434–37 (2015)
(discussing “black-box medicine” and the use of opaque computational models to make
decisions related to health care).
335. Price, supra note 246, at 1419–36.
336. See supra Section IV.A.1.
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available to the research community.337 The “All of Us” cohort provides a start,
but the NIH could go even further, broadening the reach of potential data,
populations included, and research analyses supported.
V.

CONCLUSION

Grants are a useful tool in the innovation toolbox. Although there is some
truth to common critiques—bureaucrats are involved in decisions, individual
grants are indeed ex ante funding with relatively low accountability, and the
government doesn’t profit directly from grant-funded research—the reality is
much more complex, and the critiques mask this complexity. Funding
decisions are largely made by scientists based on scientific merit, the repeatplayer nature of grants creates accountability, and the government and society
reap substantial indirect benefits from grants whether they succeed or fail.
Moreover, the grant application process and the peer review process bring
considerable information and expertise to bear on government choices about
what projects to fund.
While I am enthusiastic about what the grant system has to offer, I do not
mean to suggest, a naïve Pollyanna, that the system is wrinkle-free. The three
critiques have some truth to them and the system has other problems. The
system of repeat players can privilege experience and erect barriers to entry for
new innovators, especially innovators who do not tread the typical path.338
Seeking grants can consume inordinate amount of a researcher’s time and
energy;339 postdoctoral fellows can be trapped in fellowships or chased from
science by the unavailability of grants.340 And the hunt for scarce money can
warp research priorities despite the best efforts of funders and peer reviewers.
Grants are not perfect.
Nevertheless, the overall system, the aggregation of scientific knowledge

337. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Risk and Resilience in Health Data Infrastructure, 16 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 65, 77–83 (2017) (discussing the benefits of investment in health data
infrastructure).
338. See supra notes 158–165 and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., Dr. No Money: The Broken Science Funding System, SCI. AM. (May 1, 2011),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/dr-no-money/
[https://perma.cc/TRB9G5ML] (arguing that scientists spend too much time raising funds instead of doing
experiments); Matt Welsh, The Secret Lives of Professors, MATT-WELSH.BLOGSPOT (May 24,
2010),
http://matt-welsh.blogspot.com/2010/05/secret-lives-of-professors.html
[https://perma.cc/NCQ6-FLF8] (discussing the marketing and fundraising aspect of science).
340. See, e.g., Muhammed Z. Ahmed, The Postdoc Crisis, SCIENTIST (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.the-scientist.com/opinion/opinion-the-postdoc-crisis-34259
[https://perma.cc/6WQW-KKSN] (arguing that postdoctoral fellows have few prospects in
academia because of funding issues).
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and priorities—with input from the government as to social benefit—is not
inferior to determinations that arise from private market aggregation of private
knowledge; it’s just different. The grant system has its own flaws and foibles,
but also, importantly, presents an alternative decision-making process that
avoids the flaws and foibles of the market-dominated systems of other
innovation levers. If our only goal is the cheapest development of drugs for
the wealthy, then we can probably rely only on market mechanisms to allocate
innovation and do just fine. But if we care more broadly about the formation
of new scientific fields before the promise of obvious commercial profits, the
development of drugs for the poor, the creation of difficult-to-exclude
knowledge, the nourishment of mobile young scientists, the creation of
interdisciplinary networks, or the pursuit of other goals that the market and
private knowledge can neither appropriately value nor staff, then grants
provide an attractive set of policy options. Grants are not the only way to
pursue these goals, but they use a different way of gathering information and
allocating resources that make such pursuits more straightforward.
A complete understanding of the role of grants in the innovation
ecosystem demands more study, both theoretical and empirical. In addition to
comparisons of grants with other innovation levers that incorporate a more
nuanced view of grants, future studies could examine more closely how
different levers function together.341 Innovation levers don’t work in a vacuum;
trade secrets exist before patents, researchers can patent results of both grantfunded research and private research subsidized through the tax system, prizes
kick in at the end, and grants can stretch across multiple innovative efforts.
We should understand how these levers work in concert—or how they
compete against and distort one another.342 Such scholarship could include
large-scale quantitative analyses of many actors across the economy, smallscale examinations of specific innovation contexts,343 or theoretical
conceptions of how different levers can and should interact.344 The political

341. Brett Frischmann, Michael Madison, and Kathy Strandburg’s work on studying
innovation commons involves this sort of thick, cross-lever innovation exploration, though
focused on the role of information commons. See generally GOVERNING MEDICAL
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Katherine J. Strandburg, Brett M. Frischmann & Michael J.
Madison, eds., 2017).
342. See, e.g., Price & Rai, supra note 254 (describing innovation-stifling effects from the
intersection of patents, trade secrecy, and regulatory product definitions).
343. See, e.g., Sarnoff, Likely Mismatch, supra note 31, at 374–80 (noting the context
specificity of innovation incentives); Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 38 (same); Hemel &
Ouellette, supra note 2, at 378–80 (discussing the mix of innovation levers deployed in the
context of orphan drugs).
344. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa L. Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism (2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (theorizing and describing examples of the
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economy of grants—routinely receiving bipartisan support from Congress, but
nonetheless vulnerable to political vicissitudes and potentially changing
funding345—further shapes their place in the innovation policy toolbox and
deserves closer examination in this literature. Finally, studies of grants as part
of the innovation policy toolbox should consider the nitty-gritty details of how
grants work best on the ground, incorporating empirical studies from the
economics of innovation into the design of research policy.346 Improving grant
functioning could even involve its own experimentation, changing funding
mechanisms for just a subset of innovators and evaluating the results.347 Grants
are a key part of the innovation ecosystem, but they are often not treated that
way by the literature on innovation law and policy. It is time for that to change.


mixture of intellectual property and non-IP mechanisms in innovation policy).
345. See Deepak Hegde & David C. Mowery, Politics and Funding in the U.S. Public Biomedical
R&D System, 322 SCIENCE 1797 (2008) (noting some evidence of the politicization of the
grants process); Pear, supra note 5 (reporting that Congress rejected President Trump’s
proposal to cut N.I.H funding and instead increased funding).
346. See, e.g., Freeman & Van Reenan, supra note 91 (examining the impact of the 1998–
2003 doubling of the NIH budget on the biomedical sciences); Michael Levitt & Jonathan M.
Levitt, Future of Fundamental Discovery in US Biomedical Research, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
6498 (2017) (finding bias against awarding grants to younger applicants, in favor of older
principal investigators).
347. See Pierre Azoulay, Joshua S. Graff Zivin & Gustavo Manso, National Institutes of
Health Peer Review: Challenges and Avenues for Reform, in 13 INNOVATION POLICY & THE
ECONOMY 1, 13–16 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2013) (examining peer-review practices
in light of NIH’s bias for funding older scientists and the innovativeness of that funded
research).



